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ADVICE
Sean Hannon Williams*
This Article seeks to resurrect an ancient technology for enhancing
the welfare of others: peer advice. For decisions as variable as whether to
eat a marshmallow or which dialysis treatment to undergo, advice-giving
is a powerful and as-yet-unrecognized debiasing tool. In fact, it is one of
the most comprehensive and effective debiasing tools ever studied. People
who succumb to motivated reasoning, hyperbolic discounting, and a host
of other biases offer advice that is untainted by them. When advising
others, we are more creative, process information and probability more
rationally, and see the forest rather than the trees. Far from the blind
leading the blind, our friends and family see us and our situation far more
clearly than we do. Currently, peer advice is an entirely untapped
resource. Promoting, incentivizing, or even sometimes mandating advice
can help us improve our decision-making in numerous contexts such as
consumer contracts, health care, education, and financial planning.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship is awash with novel proposals to promote welfare. The
behavioral law and economics tradition has brought nudges and choice architecture
into the mainstream.1 Related work highlights the ways that corporations know us
better than we know ourselves and could be forced to disclose useful information
about us.2 More recent scholarship focuses on the futuristic possibility of using big
data and artificial intelligence (AI) to dynamically generate personalized legal

1

See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (2008).
2
Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS
L. REV. 93, 95 (2010).
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directives for each person in every situation.3 As scholars explore these new
strategies and new technologies, they should be careful not to lose sight of older and
sometimes more effective ones. This Article seeks to resurrect an ancient technology
for enhancing the welfare of others: advice from friends and family.
The first novel insight of this Article is that corporations are not the only ones
who know us better than we know ourselves. Long before AI and big data, friends
and family accomplished similar feats with HI (Human Intelligence). Across a
number of domains, others can make more accurate predictions about our lives than
we can. This is true even of the most intimate aspects of our lives. Other people are
better than you at predicting your personality traits, who you’ll be dating in a year,
whether you’ll be fired from your job, whether you’ll die of a heart attack, what
grade you’ll get on the next exam, whether you’ll donate to charity, and much more.4
These epistemic advantages are especially surprising given that other people often
judge based on far less information than we ourselves possess. Although they have
less information, they process it far more effectively.
The second novel insight of this Article is that advice-giving is a powerful yet
completely unexplored debiasing tool.5 The psychological distance between
advisors and advisees allows even non-expert advisors to process information free
from the distorting influence of the fundamental attribution error, confirmation bias,
and other forms of motivated reasoning.6 Advisors also give advice that is untainted
by ambiguity aversion, loss aversion, betrayal aversion, omission bias, and
hyperbolic discounting.7
Marshmallows can help provide a concrete illustration. What happens when
you put a marshmallow in front of a three-year-old? They eat it.8 What if you tell
3

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part II.
5
Other legal scholarship asks whether, and under what circumstances, taking expert
advice can help people make better decisions. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1,
at 141 (discussing experts with conflicts of interest); Christopher Tarver Robertson, Biased
Advice, 60 EMORY L.J. 653, 665–69 (2011); Justin Sevier & Kelli Alces Williams,
Consumers, Seller-Advisors, and the Psychology of Trust, 59 B.C. L. REV. 931, 990 (2018)
(discussing consumer trust in expert advisors with conflicts of interest). This work focuses
on the incentives or biases of experts and is not necessarily about debiasing laypersons at all.
Taking a financial planner’s advice can lead to better outcomes (like more retirement
savings) even if you are still biased when making your own decisions. This is the first piece
of legal scholarship to argue that the process of giving advice has a debiasing effect, at least
for non-experts without conflicts of interest. This is also the first piece of legal scholarship
to explore the benefits of peer advice rather than expert advice.
6
See infra Part II.A.1. These or other distortions may exist when advisors have conflicts
of interest, such as when a professional advisor is paid more when you make a worse
decision. These conflicts of interest are unlikely to significantly affect most peer advice. See
id.
7
See infra notes 82, 90 and accompanying text.
8
See WALTER MISCHEL, THE MARSHMALLOW TEST: MASTERING SELF-CONTROL 47
(2014); see also The Telegraph, The Marshmallow Test: Can Children Learn Self-Control?,
4
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them that, if they refrain from eating it, they will get two marshmallows later? The
child’s ability to wait correlates with various outcomes later in life, like SAT scores.9
For our purposes, the most interesting finding of this research comes when
researchers allow children to give each other advice. Three-year-olds recommend
that others delay gratification to earn extra treats, even when they cannot overcome
their own visceral desires to do so themselves.10 To put the point in more technical
terms, the same people who routinely succumb to hyperbolic discounting will give
advice that is unaffected by this bias.
Third, even outside of the traditional set of heuristics and biases, advice has
immense benefits. Even rational people might experience literacy or numeracy
limits. Advice can help people overcome literacy and numeracy issues because
advice harnesses the power of other people’s experiences. Consider a thought
experiment about Miranda warnings. Some scholars have wondered whether
Miranda warnings should be simplified to make them easier to understand.11 This
might help overcome some literacy concerns. But experience might well be a better
teacher. It might tell you not to talk to the police. Advice can harness that experience.
Suppose the police could not question you until after they read you the Miranda
warnings and you called two friends to receive advice. What might those friends
say? Probably something like: “Keep your mouth shut.” I’m not advocating this
particular reform, but it begins to show that we might make much different (and
perhaps much more rational) decisions if we tapped into peer advice.
Advice also mitigates overload effects. People just don’t have time to read all
of the relevant information about consumer products, retirement, or their health
status. Trying to do so would be overwhelming. Peer advisors do better. They try
harder, make more rational investments in searching for and processing information,
and are less susceptible to overload effects and decision fatigue.12 Relatedly, people
who suffer from high anxiety make choices for others that are not hampered by this
trait.13
YOUTUBE (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8M7Xzjy_m8
[https://perma.cc/4VQX-BZGS].
9
Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel & Phillip K. Peake, Predicting Adolescent Cognitive
and Self-Regulatory Competencies from Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identifying
Diagnostic Conditions, 26 DEV. PSYCH. 978, 980–82 (1990); see also Tanya R. Schlam,
Nicole L. Wilson, Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel & Ozlem Ayduk, Preschoolers’ Delay of
Gratification Predicts Their Body Mass 30 Years Later, 162 J. PEDIATRICS 90, 90 (2013).
10
Angela Prencipe & Philip David Zelazo, Development of Affective Decision Making
for Self and Other: Evidence for the Integration of First- and Third-Person Perspectives, 16
PSYCH. SCI. 501, 503 (2005) (testing children with various “treats” like candy, stickers, and
pennies).
11
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App: Metaphor and
Machine, 97 B.U. L. REV. 935, 938, 959–60 (2017).
12
See infra Part II.A.4.
13
Laura D. Wray & Eric R. Stone, The Role of Self-Esteem and Anxiety in Decision
Making for Self Versus Others in Relationships, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 125, 129,
131–32 (2005).
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Advice-giving even increases creativity. Consider the following riddle:
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found a rope in his
cell that was half as long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely.
He divided the rope in half, tied the two parts together, and escaped. How
could he have done this?14
People are more likely to solve riddles like this when they imagine that another
person is in the tower, and that they are solving the riddle for them.15 More generally,
people tend to be more creative and more likely to see the big picture when they
advise others, compared to when they make decisions for themselves.16
These diverse studies paint a single picture: even non-expert advisors will tend
to point people in welfare-enhancing directions. A related body of research shows
that advisees tend to respond by moving in that direction. Advisees routinely follow
good advice, discount bad advice, and respond sensibly to many features of the
advice context.17 Although at first blush, readers may have thought that peer advice
would just be the blind leading the blind, nothing could be further from the truth.
Overall, people who take the perspective of the advisor are not blind, and they can
offer valuable guidance to those of us who are. Peer advice could be a powerful tool
and improve decision-making in a host of substantive areas, like small value loan
markets, consumer contracts, retirement saving, student debt, health, and lay risk
assessment.
If peer advice is a resource worth tapping into, the next question is how to do
so. This Article explores several strategies. These could include providing incentives
for people to seek advice, advising people to seek advice, or promoting norms that
support advice. Interestingly, advising people just to simulate advice by asking them
what their family might say, or what advice they would give a friend, carries many
of the same benefits as receiving advice.18 Just as the “what would Jesus do”
movement uses this strategy to improve moral reasoning, policymakers could use it
to improve decision-making in a host of other domains.
The Article then takes a futuristic turn. Everyday traditional advice has an
important role to play even in a hypothetical future where AI can predict our goals
and how best to achieve them. Recent scholarship on personalized law takes an
extremely optimistic view of technological progress and envisions powerful AIs

14

Evan Polman & Kyle J. Emich, Decisions for Others Are More Creative than
Decisions for the Self, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 492, 496 (2011).
15
Id. at 496 (finding that less than half of the subjects solved the above riddle when
they imagined themselves in the tower, but two-thirds of people solved the riddle when they
imagined another person was in the tower). The answer to the riddle is in footnote 95.
16
Id. at 494–95.
17
See infra Part II.B.
18
See infra Part III.B.
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sifting through massive amounts of real-time data about each and every one of us.19
These AIs may have access to your bank records, web searches, texts, real-time data
on your heart rate and sleep patterns, etc. They may be able to predict your
personality traits, fleeting moods, goals, and dreams. As this literature has noticed,
an AI this knowledgeable may be able to offer exceedingly accurate advice.20 But
our traditional practices of advice-giving maintain several important benefits, even
in this future world. People are more likely to listen to advice or credit factual
assertions when they trust the speaker. For high stakes decisions, trust is more a
function of emotional connection and less about expertise.21 Even holding trust
constant, emotional connections allow others to influence us. Friends and family can
influence us in ways that strangers cannot, regardless of how much we believe the
stranger is an expert in whatever field is most relevant to the decision at hand.
Accordingly, AI advice and peer advice have complementary strengths. The former
has exceedingly accurate content. The latter can bundle content in emotionally
cognizant packaging that makes people more likely to hear and heed the advice.
Hybrid approaches can capture the best of each.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II canvases the psychological literature
on non-expert peer advice. It argues that advice-giving has powerful debiasing
effects and that people tend to use advice to improve their decisions. Part III explores
ways to tap into advice and use it as a regulatory resource. Part IV provides several
illustrations of hybrid systems where peer advice and AI each have important roles
to play, even in a hypothetical future where AI advice is personalized and
exceedingly accurate. Part V concludes.
II. THE POWER OF ADVICE
We have all given advice; we have all received advice. We probably have a
fairly good common sense feel for what advice is. Nonetheless, a more formal
account will be useful. Perhaps most quintessentially, advice is a “specific
recommendation concerning what the decision-maker ought to do.”22 Advice also

19
See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards,
92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1402, 1409 (2017) (“Imagine a world where lawmakers enact a catalog of
precisely tailored laws, specifying the exact behavior that is permitted in every situation. The
lawmakers have enough information to anticipate virtually all contingencies, such that laws
are perfectly calibrated to their purpose—they are neither over- nor underinclusive.”);
Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer
Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309, 312 (2019) (“With the help of big data,
it could be possible to provide consumers with information that is tailored to their situations,
personalities, demographic characteristics, and cognitive capabilities.”).
20
Sean Hannon Williams, AI Advice, FLA. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript
on file with author).
21
See infra note 283.
22
Reeshad S. Dalal & Silvia Bonaccio, What Types of Advice Do Decision-Makers
Prefer?, 112 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 11, 11–12 (2010).
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includes recommendations against certain actions.23 Accordingly, we would all
recognize statements like the following as advice: “Apply to a safety school,” “Don’t
go to Florida during hurricane season,” and “Dump him, now!”24 Advice can also
be about the process of decision-making rather than the final decision.25 For
example, “Make sure to consider Y and Z when deciding what to do” is a form of
advice.
Readers are unlikely to question the value of expert advice. Doctors, lawyers,
and financial advisors all provide advice about decisions or decisional processes.
Doctors might advise you to stop smoking. Lawyers might recommend that you
consider the cost and length of litigation before filing suit. Financial advisors might
suggest that you save more for retirement. At least when these advisors do not have
conflicts of interest, their specialized knowledge allows them to offer useful advice.
This Article explores the benefits of peer advice rather than expert advice. Peer
advice includes everyday advice from friends, family, acquaintances, and even
strangers.26 These people have no special training. To align the discussion with the
available research, this Part will focus on personalized advice offered by one
individual to another where the advisor does not have any significant conflicts of
interest. This fairly describes a great deal of advice between friends and family.
Unlike professional advisors, friends and family members will not normally have
conflicts of interest; they want us to do well and will not have any other direct stake
in the relevant decision.27 Much advice is also personalized for the advisee rather
than meant to be heard by a large group of others.28 The discussion will also set aside
group decision-making dynamics, which might be relevant when a group of people
deliberate about what advice to give.29 Peer advice includes a great deal of everyday
23

Id.
Id. Most people are not lawyers, and so most people don’t try to parse language as
precisely as lawyers commonly do. “I would not do that if I were you,” is not a
recommendation, at least grammatically speaking. It is a disclosure. But the context in which
those words were spoken might well make it clear that it is a form of advice.
25
Id.
26
In the economics literature, this is sometimes called “naive advice” to clarify its
contrast to expert advice. Julia Sprenger, Naïve Advice in Financial Decision Making:
Hidden Costs of a Free Offer, RUHR ECON. PAPERS, No. 656 (2016); Andrew Schotter,
Decision Making with Naive Advice, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 196, 196 (2003). But as this Article
will illustrate, peer advice is anything but naive.
27
Of course, this is not always the case. A greedy daughter may advise her elderly
parents in ways that maximize her future inheritance rather than her parents’ welfare.
28
A blog post might include generalized advice of the latter sort.
29
For an overview of group decision-making dynamics and how they are subject to
different distortions than individual decision-making, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN &
REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER (2015).
For an overview of advice-taking by groups, see Lyn M. Van Swol & Andrew Prahl, Giving
and Receiving Advice in Groups, Networks, and Organizations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF ADVICE 111, 112–17 (Erina L. MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol eds., 2018). Group
dynamics are unlikely to be relevant to most everyday advice, with the possible exception of
24
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advice between friends and family members, where for example, one friend talks
with another friend over coffee about what they should do.
Peer advice can be a potent force for enhancing the welfare of both advisee and
advisor. Advice is often surprisingly good, and people often listen to good advice.30
Research shows that advisors largely avoid the heuristics and biases that bog us
down when we make decisions for ourselves. When giving advice, people process
information more rationally, are more motivated to find the best solution, and are
more creative problem solvers. Advisees seem to appreciate these advantages, at
least implicitly. They listen to advice. More specifically, good advice tends to
influence people’s choices in positive ways, while bad advice is more quickly
discounted. Peer advice may not always recommend the optimal solution, but it does
seem to do a fairly good job of moving people in welfare-enhancing directions. This
Part explores the benefits of advice from two perspectives: giving advice and getting
advice.31

spouses. Spouses might deliberate about what advice to give their adult child or whether to
take the advice of their financial planner. But even here, research on group decision-making
seems like a poor fit. Spouses are a very unique “group” that merit their own specialized
research. For an overview of research that focuses specifically on spousal communication
and decision-making, see Tara L. Queen, Cynthia A. Berg & William Lowrance, A
Framework for Decision Making in Couples Across Adulthood, in AGING AND DECISION
MAKING: EMPIRICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 371, 372 (Thomas Hess, JoNell Strough
& Corinna E. Löckenhoff eds., 2015) (“The existing work on decision making in couples is
in its infancy and only scratches the surface of the potential for our understanding of the
phenomenon.”).
30
This Article defines “good” in welfarist terms. A rough definition of good advice
would therefore be advice that, if followed, would lead the advisee to make a decision that
is more welfare-enhancing than the decision she would have made absent the advice. This is
only a rough definition. For example, it does not address the potentially thorny issue of
advisors who rely on reverse psychology and offer facially welfare-reducing
recommendations in the hopes that the advisee will do the opposite. A fuller definition might
also grapple with the proper definition of the underlying concept of welfare, the magnitudes
of the relevant welfare gains, and variations in the probability of heeding a particular piece
of advice. Nonetheless, the rough definition is sufficient for the purposes of this Article.
31
Other legal scholars mention advice, but do not discuss everyday peer advice. Omri
Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider claim that people “want advice,” not mandated disclosure.
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 185 (2014). Their brief discussion does not mention
personalized peer advice. Rather, they offer examples of non-personalized expert advice (US
News, Consumer Reports), personalized expert advice from professional advisors (brokers,
doctors), and aggregated non-personalized peer opinions (star ratings on Amazon or eBay).
Id. at 185–86; see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More than You Wanted to Know
About the Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 64, 71 (2015)
(noting that Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s definition of advice, when applied to star ratings,
is more aptly called “opinion data as disclosure”).
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A. Giving Advice: The Blind Leading the Blind?
At first blush, one might think that peer advice does not have much to offer. On
the standard law and economics account, we are all rational and will optimally invest
in information.32 Here, either people will already seek advice or advice is not
necessary. Under the standard behavioral law and economics account, we all suffer
from various biases that impede decision-making.33 But if the advisor also suffers
from biases, how is she supposed to provide competent advice? This brings to mind
the following parable: “[I]f the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.”34
This section confronts the many ways in which this parable does not apply to advice.
1. Motivated Reasoning and the Benefits of Perspective
Just as corporations might know us better than we know ourselves,35 other
people can know us better than we know ourselves. Across a number of domains,
others can make more accurate predictions about our lives than we can. This is true
even of the most intimate aspects of our lives. Suppose you are dating someone and
you want to know whether you will still be dating them in a year. What should you
do? Ask your mom. Or your roommate. Both make more accurate predictions than
you would.36 Even more telling, once you have the predictions of your mom and
your roommate, how much new information can you yourself provide? None.37 Your
32

See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6, 134.
Id. at 23.
34
Matthew 15:14 (King James); see also Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 31, at 71 (noting
that consumer-created star ratings are unlikely to help consumers avoid harmful boilerplate
when no one reads it, not even the consumers creating the star ratings).
35
Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents,
Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized
Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 582 (2019) (“[B]usinesses know at least as much about
consumers as consumers know about themselves, and sometimes even more.”).
36
Tara MacDonald & Michael Ross, Assessing the Accuracy of Predictions About
Dating Relationships: How and Why Do Lovers’ Predictions Differ from Those Made by
Observers?, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1417, 1423–24 (1999). Anyone who is
familiar with the literature on overoptimism might think some of these results are
unsurprising. But the students’ self-predictions were not wrong merely because they were
too optimistic. In fact, the students in this study were surprisingly realistic. On average, they
predicted that there was only a 70% chance that they would be together in a year. Id. at 1422.
Parents and roommates were less optimistic, but not overwhelmingly so. Parents predicted a
50% chance that the relationship would survive, and roommates gave the couple 60-40 odds.
Id. So your inability to assess your own fate is not merely the result of being crazy in love.
It implicates a much larger range of biases related to processing information. That is, couples
may have all the information they need to accurately predict relationship outcomes, but they
don’t use that information. Other studies show similar results. See, e.g., Timothy Loving,
Predicting Dating Relationship Fate with Insiders’ and Outsiders’ Perspectives: Who and
What Is Asked Matters, 12 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 349, 359 (2006).
37
MacDonald & Ross, supra note 36, at 1422.
33
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predictions—based on the vast amount of extra information that you have—are
basically useless. Others’ epistemic benefits are not limited to the romantic domain.
Surgical residents, like most other people, are overly optimistic about many things.38
Their self-predictions fail to correlate with their scores on standardized tests or
qualitative evaluations from their supervising doctors.39 But the predictions of their
peers are highly correlated with both measures of success.40 Studies of
undergraduate grades show similar results. Peers can predict your grade on the next
exam as accurately as you can, and they can achieve this accuracy with far less
information than you possess.41 Particularly relevant to many financial matters,
advisors are also more accurate than you at predicting whether you will experience
changes in income. When naval officers rated their own leadership skills, the
resulting scores were uncorrelated with later promotions.42 But those officers’
subordinates were not so blind. Their ratings of the officers’ leadership skills
correlated with future success.43 Will your narcissism or paranoia get you fired? Ask
your peers. Peer ratings of these and other personality disorders, but not self-ratings,
correlated with early discharge from the Air Force.44 Others can even be better at
predicting your likelihood of dying from heart disease.45
How can others make better predictions than we make for ourselves? This is
especially puzzling given that those others normally have far less information than
we do. Others outperform us not because they have more information, but because
they process information in a less biased way.
38

Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism
in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733,
742–43 (2009) (“Compared to others, people overwhelmingly think that they are smarter,
better drivers, better leaders, better managers, better workers, healthier, more socially skilled,
more sensitive, more ethical, more charitable, more likely to vote, more productive, and
(ironically) less susceptible to optimistic biases.”).
39
D. A. Risucci, A. J. Tortolani & R. J. Ward, Ratings of Surgical Residents by Self,
Supervisors and Peers, 169 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 519, 519–21 (1989).
40
Id.
41
Erik G. Helzer & David Dunning, Why and When Peer Prediction Is Superior to SelfPrediction: The Weight Given to Future Aspiration Versus Past Achievement, 103 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 38, 41–43 (2012).
42
Bernard M. Bass & Francis J. Yammarino, Congruence of Self and Others’
Leadership Ratings of Naval Officers for Understanding Successful Performance, 40
APPLIED PSYCH. 437, 450 (1991).
43
Id.
44
Edna R. Fiedler, Thomas F. Oltmanns & Eric Turkheimer, Traits Associated with
Personality Disorders and Adjustment to Military Life: Predictive Validity of Self and Peer
Reports, 169 MIL. MED. 207, 207 (2004).
45
Timothy W. Smith, Bert N. Uchino, Cynthia A. Berg, Paul Florsheim, Gale Pearce,
Melissa Hawkins, Nancy J. M. Henry, Ryan M. Beveridge, Michelle A. Skinner, Paul N.
Hopkins & Hyo-Chun Yoon, Associations of Self-Reports Versus Spouse Ratings of Negative
Affectivity, Dominance, and Affiliation with Coronary Artery Disease: Where Should We
Look and Who Should We Ask When Studying Personality and Health?, 27 HEALTH PSYCH.
676, 676 (2008).
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Self-predictions are plagued by motivated reasoning.46 “How good a student
are you?” “Will you donate to charity?” When people answer these questions, they
rely too heavily on their aspirations and goals. But when they answer similar
questions about others, they rely on past behavior and verifiable data. Others are
what they have done; I am what I hope to be.47
Put another way, people are incredibly accurate social psychologists but
abysmal self-psychologists.48 People are anywhere between roughly and shockingly
accurate at predicting others’ behavior. They can predict how many of their peers
will donate to charity,49 how many of their peers will allow their current fleeting
mood to affect their donation,50 how many of their peers will cooperate in a

46

Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review,
9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 309 (2013) (“The modern day psychological theory of
motivated reasoning holds that when decision makers have a preference regarding the
outcome of an evaluative task, they are more likely to arrive at that desired conclusion by
engaging in inadvertently biased processes for accessing, constructing, and evaluating
beliefs.” (internal quotes omitted)); Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Mechanics of
Motivated Reasoning, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 136 (2016) (“Most people do not reason like
impartial judges, but instead recruit evidence like attorneys, looking for evidence that
supports a desired belief while trying to steer clear of evidence that refutes it.”); see, e.g.,
Elanor F. Williams & Thomas Gilovich, The Better-Than-My-Average Effect: The Relative
Impact of Peak and Average Performances in Assessments of the Self and Others, 48 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 556, 556–61 (2012) (finding that most people pick their most
attractive photo as the most representative one, but they choose a more average photo when
making this same choice for others).
47
Elanor F. Williams & Thomas Gilovich, Conceptions of the Self and Others Across
Time, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1037, 1040 (2008). In the most thorough
examination of this dynamic, students were asked to predict another person’s grade and
asked to help another student predict theirs. They were given monetary incentives for
accuracy. That is, they were paid if they accurately predicted the other student’s grade, and
they were paid again if the other student accurately predicted theirs. When they were asked
what information they wanted from the other student, they asked for past exam scores. But
when they were asked what information they wanted to give to the other student, they mostly
chose to pass along the score that they hoped to get. Id. at 1038–40; see also Helzer &
Dunning, supra note 41, at 42–43.
48
See generally Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, Considering the Situation: Why
People Are Better Social Psychologists than Self-Psychologists, 12 SELF & IDENTITY 1
(2013) [hereinafter Balcetis & Dunning, Considering the Situation].
49
Emily Balcetis & David A. Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins: How Situational
Experience Diminishes Dispositionism in Social Inference, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 102, 107 (2008) [hereinafter Balcetis & Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins] (finding that
subjects predicted 44% of people would buy a flower, and 29% did).
50
Balcetis & Dunning, Considering the Situation, supra note 48, at 8–11.
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prisoner’s dilemma,51 and how many will help another person.52 They also
understand that base rates are an important source of information when predicting
another’s behavior.53 But these insights falter when people make predictions about
themselves.54
Perhaps most surprisingly, others are better at identifying your personality traits
than you are.55 Overall, other-ratings of the big five personality traits—
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion, and openness—
are much more predictive of outcomes like GPA than self-rated personality traits.56
One of the big five—conscientiousness—is particularly relevant to financial
decisions.57 Conscientiousness reflects the tendency to be organized, responsible,
51

Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling “Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving
Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 861, 864 (2000) (finding that subjects predicted that 64% of their peers would
cooperate during a prisoner’s dilemma game, and 61% actually cooperated).
52
Balcetis & Dunning, Considering the Situation, supra note 48, at 6–8 (finding that
subjects predicted that others would be 22 percentage points more likely to help a person
who spilled a 300 piece puzzle on the floor if they were alone and when researchers actually
spilled puzzle pieces in front of other students, subjects turned out to be 27 percentage points
more likely to help if they were alone).
53
Emily Balcetis, Claiming a Moral Minority, Saccades Help Create a Biased
Majority: Tracking Eye Movements to Base Rates in Social Predictions, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCH. 970, 971 (2009) (finding that subjects consulted base-rate information about
twice as often when making predictions about others than when making self-predictions).
54
Id.; Balcetis & Dunning, A Mile in Moccasins, supra note 49, at 107 (finding that
83% of subjects predicted that they would buy a flower, but only 29% did); Epley &
Dunning, supra note 51, at 864 (finding that 84% of subjects predicted they would cooperate
in a prisoner’s dilemma game, while only 61% actually cooperated); Balcetis & Dunning,
Considering the Situation, supra note 48, at 6–11. Consider also the following questions:
Will making a task harder reduce your performance? Will reminders help increase the
likelihood that you will participate in a study? As a social psychologist, the obvious and
correct answer to these is: Yes. But people think they will be awesome regardless of the
difficulty of the task, and they think they are so on top of their schedule that they don’t need
reminders. See Helzer & Dunning, supra note 41, at 48.
55
This is not true across the board. Some traits are harder for others to see and some
traits are more linked to self-image and hence more likely to be distorted in self-reports.
Overall, for traits that are both more internal and more neutral, self-reports outperform otherreports. Samine Vazire & Erika N. Carlson, Others Sometimes Know Us Better than We
Know Ourselves, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 104, 104 (2011).
56
Arthur E. Poropat, Other-Rated Personality and Academic Performance: Evidence
and Implications, 34 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 24, 29 (2014).
57
Yilan Xu, Andrea H. Beller, Brent W. Roberts & Jeffrey R. Brown, Personality and
Young Adult Financial Distress, 51 J. ECON. PSYCH. 90, 92 (2015) (noting that
conscientiousness has the strongest link to financial outcomes among the big five personality
traits); S. Brown & K. Taylor, Household Finances and the “Big Five” Personality Traits,
45 J. ECON. PSYCH. 197, 204 (2014) (finding that individuals high in conscientiousness have
less unsecured debt and manage debt better). It also has a large impact on academic success.
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dutiful, and self-disciplined.58 People who are high in conscientiousness are less
likely to experience financial distress, and they accumulate more wealth over their
lifetime.59 They are also less likely to miss a payment.60 This is particularly relevant
to financial products because late fees are an important source of profits.61
Who is the best judge of your conscientiousness? Others. Other-reports show
twice the correlation with relevant outcomes compared to self-reports.62 Given the
link between conscientiousness and financial outcomes, one researcher recently
called for “financial planning tools that help make consumers aware of their lack of
conscientiousness . . . and . . . behavioral interventions to help them overcome
them.”63 Peer advice is a good candidate for such a reform. Others have argued that
in the era of big data, companies might have better information about us than we
have about ourselves.64 A loan company, for example, sees us with clearer eyes. But
so too do our friends and family.65 They can point out times when we joined a gym
and never went, the time when we forgot to register for classes, the times when we
broke our diet, etc.66
Even if others can make accurate predictions about us, we might worry that the
process of transferring that knowledge through advice might introduce new biases
or errors. That is, others may accurately predict your GPA or job performance when
reporting it to a neutral third party, but the dynamic might change if they are trying
to tell you what they predict or offering you advice rooted in that prediction. Luckily,
Seth A. Wagerman & David C. Funder, Acquaintance Reports of Personality and Academic
Achievement: A Case for Conscientiousness, 41 J. RSCH. PERSONALITY 221, 221–22 (2007).
58
Jodi C. Letkiewicz & Jonathan J. Fox, Conscientiousness, Financial Literacy, and
Asset Accumulation of Young Adults, 48 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 274, 275 (2014).
59
Xu et al., supra note 57, at 91.
60
Id. at 95.
61
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1393 n.105 (2004).
62
Wagerman & Funder, supra note 57, at 225; see also Denis Bratko, Tomas
Chamorro-Premuzic & Zrnka Saks, Personality and School Performance: Incremental
Validity of Self-and Peer-Ratings over Intelligence, 41 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 131, 131 (2006) (“[P]ersonality accounted for unique variance in school
grades: 18% by self- and 25% by peer-ratings. Self-ratings had only marginal incremental
validity over peer-ratings in predicting school grades (3%).”). Others are also better at rating
your intelligence, another trait with obvious implications for debt management. Vazire &
Carlson, supra note 55, at 106; Yoav Ganzach & Moty Amar, Intelligence and the
Repayment of High-and Low-Consequences Debt, 110 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 102, 102 (2017).
63
Xu et al., supra note 57, at 98.
64
See Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 2, at 95.
65
For example, they might encourage us to set up payment reminders. You might think
that people would do this on their own, but again, people are better social psychologists than
self-psychologists. They accurately predict that others would benefit from reminders, but
don’t spontaneously think they will need them. Derek J. Koehler & Connie S.K. Poon, SelfPredictions Overweight Strength of Current Intentions, 42 J. EXPIREMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
517, 520 (2006).
66
They can also point out when we are suffering from confirmation bias.
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we need not speculate. Research on advice shows that advice-giving mitigates,
rather than introduces, various biases.
When people advise others, they are able to filter and prioritize information in
a way that they have trouble doing when they make decisions for themselves. In one
study, people donated more to charities that had a physically attractive
representative.67 But when people instead advised others on which charity to donate
to, this beauty premium disappeared.68 Doctors report that patients often choose
treatments based on such shallow factors as which one avoids large needles.69 When
doctors advise patients, they appropriately discount the importance of these visceral
factors, even though they often succumb to similar myopic overreactions when
deciding for themselves.70
Consider also the confirmation bias, which describes the tendency for
individuals to seek out information that supports their preferred outcome.71 An early
study of advice-giving found that advisors do not suffer from confirmation bias.72
Subjects were sorted into deciders and advisors, and each subject was offered an
opportunity to conduct research related to an everyday decision: where to go on
vacation.73 Deciders succumbed to confirmation bias.74 They selectively ignored
information that conflicted with their preliminary choice.75 Advisors, in contrast,

67

Jason Dana & Daylian M. Cain, Advice Versus Choice, 6 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 173,
174 (2015).
68
Id. This more accurate filtering of information is consistent with the academic studies
mentioned above. There, students could not ignore their aspirational test score when making
their self-predictions, but rightly discounted such information when predicting another
person’s score. Helzer & Dunning, supra note 41, at 49.
69
BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 66.
70
In one study, doctors were asked to choose between two treatments for colon cancer.
Peter A. Ubel, Andrea M. Angott & Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, Physicians Recommend
Different Treatments for Patients than They Would Choose for Themselves, 171 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 630, 631–32 (2011). Both offered the patient an 80% chance of a complete
cure, but they had different side effects. Id. The first treatment created a 20% chance of death.
Id. The second treatment created a 16% chance of death and a 4% chance of other
complications like chronic diarrhea. Id. The side effects were pretested to ensure that they
were all overwhelmingly preferred to death. Id. The second treatment is clearly better, again,
as long as those side effects are better than death. Id. Yet many more doctors choose the first
treatment for themselves, while fewer choose the first treatment for their patient. Id. When
deciding for others, these doctors were able to put their visceral feeling about things like
intermittent bowel obstructions aside and focus on the most important feature: mortality. Id.
71
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 (1998).
72
Eva Jonas & Dieter Frey, Information Search and Presentation in Advisor—Client
Interactions, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 154, 161 (2003).
73
Id. at 159.
74
Id. at 160.
75
Id.
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conducted a balanced information search.76 This study also highlights the benefits
of peer advice compared to expert advice. Although all advisors avoided
confirmation bias when selecting information, subjects who played the role of a
travel agent ignored negative information when presenting the decider with their
recommendation.77 Friends, in contrast, presented the decider with balanced
information that included both good and bad aspects of their recommendations.78
A body of research adjacent to advice also supports the claim that taking on the
role of advisor will have a debiasing effect.79 This research asks people to make
decisions for others. This is certainly different than merely giving advice. But many
of these studies ask people to make decisions that they simply could not make for
others in our current social and legal climate. Should your peer get a vaccination?80
Should they move in with their significant other?81 In these studies, it seems likely
that subjects read this question more as: “What would I advise them to do, given that
they will really trust my advice?” rather than, “In a dystopian world where we are
not in control over our own most personal decisions, what would you decide for
another person?” This body of research consistently finds that, when making
decisions for others (as compared to deciding for oneself), people more accurately
take probability information into account and are less likely to be affected by
betrayal aversion, loss aversion, and omission bias.82 Further, people who have low
76

Id.; see also Eva Jonas, Stefan Schulz-Hardt & Dieter Frey, Giving Advice or Making
Decisions in Someone Else’s Place: The Influence of Impression, Defense, and Accuracy
Motivation on the Search for New Information, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 977,
981 (2005) (finding that advisors show less confirmation bias than those who decide for
themselves).
77
Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 161.
78
Id.
79
See, e.g., Maria Pollai & Erich Kirchler, Differences in Risk-Defusing Behavior in
Deciding for Oneself Versus Deciding for Other People, 139 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 239
(2012).
80
Id. at 239.
81
Amy H. Beisswanger, Eric R. Stone, Julie M. Hupp & Liz Allgaier, Risk Taking in
Relationships: Differences in Deciding for Oneself Versus for a Friend, 25 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCH. 121, 134–35 (2003).
82
See Pollai & Kirchler, supra note 79, at 243 (examining the influence of the
probability of getting sick and vaccination decisions); Evan Polman, Self–Other Decision
Making and Loss Aversion, 119 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 141 (2012)
(addressing loss aversion and omission bias); Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, Brianna Sarr, Angela
Fagerlin & Peter A. Ubel, A Matter of Perspective: Choosing for Others Differs from
Choosing for Yourself in Making Treatment Decisions, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 618, 619–
20 (2006) (addressing betrayal aversion and finding that more people chose a vaccination for
others than for themselves when it eliminated a 10% chance of death but added a 5% chance
of death); cf. Christian König-Kersting & Stefan T. Trautmann, Ambiguity Attitudes in
Decisions for Others, 146 ECON. LETTERS 126, 128 (2016) (finding no differences in
ambiguity aversion between self and other decisions); Eva Jonas, Stefan Schulz-Hardt &
Dieter Frey, Giving Advice or Making Decisions in Someone Else’s Place: The Influence of
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self-esteem or high anxiety make choices for others that are not hampered by these
traits.83 Overall, this provides further support for the powerful debiasing potential of
giving advice.
2. Dread, Desire, and Psychological Distance
Making decisions about money implicates a host of strong emotions. Wealth is
often seen as a reflection of character. The decisions you make about money are not
merely instrumental, they implicate your identity and self-concept. Although people
are more motivated to make better decisions when the stakes are high (both
financially and as a matter of self-worth), that heightened motivation often
backfires.84
Heightening the emotional stakes of a decision causes significant probability
distortions. While people accurately assess probability information when
confronting the possibility of a $20 loss or gain, they all but ignore probability when
reacting to the possibility of an electric shock or the opportunity to kiss their favorite
movie star.85 For those vivid outcomes, people make decisions as if there were only
three states of the world: it won’t happen, it might happen, and it will happen.86
Similarly, even people who routinely take probability into account when faced with
potential monetary losses are significantly less sensitive to probability when faced
with negative side effects from a medication.87 This selective use of probability can
occur because negative medical and health effects trigger significantly more dread
and anticipated regret.88
Impression, Defense, and Accuracy Motivation on the Search for New Information, 31
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 977, 984 (2005) (finding a complex pattern for
confirmation bias, where deciding for others can create a stronger confirmation bias than
advising when subjects were told that they would have to justify their choice).
83
Wray & Stone, supra note 13, at 125, 129–32.
84
Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 231
(2008).
85
Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On
the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCH. SCI. 185, 186–87, 189 (2001).
86
See id. at 186; Sean Hannon Williams, Probability Errors, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LAW 335, 346–47 (Eyal Zamir & Doron
Teichman eds., 2014).
87
Nathalie F. Popovic, Thorsten Pachur & Wolfgang Gaissmmaier, The Gap Between
Medical and Monetary Choices Under Risk Persists in Decisions for Others, 32 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 388, 389 (2019) (“[I]n the medical domain compared with the monetary
domain, people focus more on avoiding the worst outcome, largely disregarding the
probability of the outcomes.”); Thorsten Pachur, Ralph Hertwig & Roland Wolkewitz, The
Affect Gap in Risky Choice: Affect-Rich Outcomes Attenuate Attention to Probability
Information, 1 DECISION 64, 64 (2014).
88
See Popovic et al., supra note 87, at 389 (“One explanation provided for the
discrepancy between medical and monetary decisions is the affective content of the different
prospects: Compared with monetary outcomes, medical side effects are often associated with
a stronger affective response.”).
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Advisors are likely to do better. Recall that, when making decisions for others,
people more accurately take probability into account.89 Relatedly, advisors also
more accurately use base rates and respond more rationally to ambiguous statistical
data.90 Advisors maintain the ability to think more clearly in part because they have
some critical distance from the relevant outcome.
The visceral-emotion-dampening effect of giving advice is consistent with a
larger body of research about psychological distance.91 The phrase psychological
distance is meant to encompass the way that people use the same set of mental tools
to represent different types of distance, including spatial distance, temporal distance,
and social distance.92 The general finding from this research is that people tend to
think more abstractly about psychologically distant things and more concretely
about psychologically near things.93 Put differently, for psychologically distant
things, they are more likely to see the forest rather than the trees. For example,
people are more likely to see the hidden picture within abstract art when they think
the images are samples of a task that they will complete in the future.94 Consider
again the following riddle:
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found a rope in his
cell that was half as long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely.
He divided the rope in half, tied the two parts together, and escaped. How
could he have done this?
People are substantially more likely to solve riddles like this when they imagine that
another person is in the tower, and that they are solving the riddle for them.95 The
increased psychological distance between subjects and the hypothetical other person

89

See Pollai & Kirchler, supra note 82; but see Popovic et al., supra note 87, at 387
(finding similar choices for selves and others, but noting: “In contrast to our findings, most
published studies on self‐other decision making have found differences between the two
decision perspectives.”).
90
Spiros Bougheas, Jeroen Nieboer & Martin Sefton, Risk-Taking in Social Settings:
Group and Peer Effects, 92 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 273, 275 (2013) (advice and ambiguity
aversion); see supra note 47 (discussing the evidence that people seek when making
predictions about others).
91
See generally Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, The Psychology of Transcending the
Here and Now, 322 SCIENCE 1201 (2008).
92
Id. at 1201–03.
93
Id. at 1203.
94
Id.
95
Polman & Emich, supra note 14, at 496 (finding that less than half of subjects solved
the above riddle when they imagined themselves in the tower, but two-thirds of people solved
the riddle when they imagined another person was in the tower; the answer is that the
prisoner splits the rope lengthwise).
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helped them think more about the big picture aspects of the decision problem, and
helped them think more creatively.96 Consider another riddle:
A dealer in antique coins got an offer to buy a beautiful bronze coin. The
coin had an emperor’s head on one side and the date 544 B.C. stamped on
the other. The dealer examined the coin but instead of buying it, he called
the police. Why?97
Here too, increasing the psychological distance between the study’s subjects and the
hypothetical dealer helped them think more creatively, and hence almost doubled
the likelihood that they would solve the riddle.98
The enhanced creativity of advisors, and their ability to see the bigger picture,
are both likely to be quite useful. For example, thinking more creatively could be
particularly helpful if the decider thinks they have no choice but to get a high-interest
loan. Seeing the big picture could help deciders avoid mistakes like choosing a
dialysis regime based solely on the size of the needles involved. Similarly, we might
not pause long in considering whether your fear of offending your dentist should
stop you from getting a second opinion about a root canal.99 The answer is “no.”
Advisors rightly discount the importance of these momentary discomforts and are
twice as likely to recommend a second opinion as they are to get one themselves.100
Apparently, when deciding for themselves people are swayed by the awkwardness
of getting the second opinion and the possibility that it would disrupt their
relationship with their dentist.101 But when advising others they (rightly) thought it
would be silly to get an unnecessary root canal just to avoid an awkward
conversation.
3. Impatience and Self-Control
A famous set of studies about marshmallows shows how even extremely young
children can and do offer good advice. In those studies, researchers place a
marshmallow in front of a child.102 Then they tell the child that if they wait and don’t
96
Id. at 496–97 (finding that increasing psychological distance increases the number of
creative solutions people spontaneously generate in the face of common challenges); id. at
494 (finding that people draw more creative aliens when they are drawing them for someone
else).
97
Lile Jia, Edward R. Hirt & Samuel C. Karpen, Lessons from a Faraway Land: The
Effect of Spatial Distance on Creative Cognition, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1127,
1130 (2009) (providing the answer that 544 years before the birth of Christ, they did not use
B.C. to indicate the date).
98
Id. at 1129.
99
Janet Schwartz, Mary Francis Luce & Dan Ariely, Are Consumers Too Trusting? The
Effects of Relationships with Expert Advisers, 48 J. MKTG. RSCH. 163, 168–69 (2011).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
MISCHEL, supra note 8, at 3–5.
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eat the first marshmallow, they will earn a second one.103 Three-year-olds generally
have not developed the capacity to resist; they just immediately eat the first
marshmallow.104 For older children, the amount of time that they are able to resist
the temptation correlates with various outcomes later in life, like SAT scores.105 For
our purposes, the most interesting finding of this research comes when they allow
children to give each other advice. Three-year-olds recommend that other kids delay
gratification to earn extra treats, even when they cannot overcome their own visceral
desires to do so themselves.106
Marshmallows and money have a lot in common. Across a host of domains,
people are impatient. They are especially impatient in the near term. The prospect
of immediate gratification exerts a strong force that causes people to exhibit steep
discount rates in the near term and more stable discount rates in the mid and long
term.107 In a classic example, people are perfectly happy to get $60 in 13 months as
opposed to $50 in 12 months. That is, they are perfectly happy to “invest” their $50
for one month and get $10 in interest—except when they can get that $50 right now.
In that case, people take the $50. That is, they are more patient for future decisions
than for present decisions.108 This pattern is sometimes labeled present-bias or
hyperbolic discounting.109 The concept of psychological distance described in the
previous section suggests that people would be more patient for both future
decisions, and decisions for other people. This is precisely what the research finds.
Present-bias is substantially weaker when making decisions for others.110 Like the
three-year-olds, adult advisors will probably recommend patience.111
103

Id.
Id. at 47.
105
Id. at 5.
106
Id. at 49; Prencipe & Zelazo, supra note 10, at 503.
107
Lawrence M. Spizman, The Inverted Nudge: An Application of Behavioral
Economic Concepts to Settlement Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL ECON. 95, 98 (2018).
108
See id. at 98–99.
109
See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and to Be
Learned, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 273, 273 (2015).
110
Fenja V. Ziegler & Richard J. Tunney, Decisions for Others Become Less Impulsive
the Further Away They Are on the Family Tree, 7 PUB. LIBR. SCI. ONE 49479, 49481 (2012);
see also Jeremy Shapiro, Discounting for You Me and We: Time Preference in Groups and
Pairs 2, 4–5 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with MIT Economics
Department),
http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/jplaces/papers
[https://perma.cc/A7QLHBW6] (finding that women in India were less impatient when making investment decisions
for others than for themselves).
111
Or, more precisely, they will recommend actions that adhere to a more consistent
discount rate rather than actions that show a significantly steeper discount rate for near-future
payouts. Discount rates that are both steep and consistent are not necessarily errors or the
result of bias. But when the person’s own preferences are inconsistent across time, one of
the person’s preferences is erroneous in her own estimation. I want to watch Netflix now,
but later I will wish that I had studied. We might say that it would be better to study. We
could do so in part because we think that the later judgment is better informed and more
104
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4. Information Overload
We just don’t have the time or bandwidth to read all of the disclosures in our
world, including the iTunes terms of service, our new credit card’s terms, our old
credit card’s updated terms, and the warning label on our new toaster.112 Relatedly,
firms may seek to cause overload problems in order to sneak terms into a contract
or bury relevant disclosures in irrelevant ones.113
Aggregated advice can reduce overload problems by radically condensing the
relevant information. Listing the percentage of people who would “recommend this
product to a friend” is one example.114 Star ratings are a closely related example.
They collapse an entire experience with a product and the business behind it into
one 5 star satisfaction rating.115
Less obviously, even non-aggregated advice is likely to offer benefits. People
are more motivated to understand a topic when they are advising others.116 This
yields a number of more specific advantages. Advisors spontaneously think of more
relevant questions,117 they seek out more information,118 they seek out more
balanced information,119 and they remember just as many details from what they

consistent with the person’s overall set of preferences. See MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 37 (2004) (discussing the “thorny
problem of conflicting preferences”).
112
For a discussion of information overload, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 31, at 94–106.
113
See id. at 23, 164, 192.
114
For one such example, see reviews on BestBuy.com.
115
Star ratings are more akin to disclosures than advice, but they illustrate the power of
aggregation. See supra note 31.
116
Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 161–63 (finding that advisor-friends were more
motivated to make good decisions than even the decider herself, regardless of whether or not
the friend was offered a monetary incentive to match the choice made by the decider); Jonas
et al., supra note 76, at 982 (same); Silvia Bonaccio & Reeshad S. Dalal, Advice Taking and
Decision-Making: An Integrative Literature Review, and Implications for the Organizational
Sciences, 101 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 127, 134 (2006) [hereinafter
Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making] (“[R]elative to personal decisionmakers, advisors exhibit greater concern about the accuracy of their recommendations and
exert more task related effort.”). This may partially explain why advice is better at improving
decisions than direct observation of the relevant facts by the decision maker. Martin Kocher,
Matthias Sutter & Florian Wakolbinger, Social Learning in Beauty‐Contest Games, 80 S.
ECON. J. 586, 603 (2014) (finding that pieces of advice “support higher depths of reasoning
as they force a subject to digest the different suggestions and build their own opinion”).
117
Laura J. Kray, Contingent Weighting in Self-Other Decision Making, 83 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 82, 91, 98, 103 (2000).
118
Id. at 103; Vered Halamish & Nira Liberman, How Much Information to Sample
Before Making a Decision? It’s a Matter of Psychological Distance, 71 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 113–14 (2017) (finding that people seek out about twice as much
information when making decisions for others); Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 161.
119
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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read.120 Consider a credit card balance-transfer offer. Advisors will be more likely
to read the small print, more likely to do additional research, and more likely to
spontaneously come up with relevant questions like: “Would the promotional rate
still apply if I miss a payment?” This mitigates overload problems and decreases the
effectiveness of hiding unwanted terms in less salient parts of the contract.
Other research provides further support for this. Choice overload describes the
tendency for people to be paralyzed by large numbers of choices.121 Advisors don’t
suffer from choice overload. Increasing the number of options tends to increase
rather than decrease their engagement.122 Advisors also suffer less decision
fatigue.123 Recall finally that people who suffer from high anxiety offer advice that
is not tainted by that anxiety.124 This suggests that advisors might be able to navigate
high stakes and numerous options better than deciders.125
Peer advice can be useful even if firms are successful in triggering overload
problems. Here, advice can alter our reactions to overload even if it cannot prevent
overload in the first place. Consider an investment advisor trying to sell you a
portfolio with high fees. They might present you with pages and pages of graphs and
forecasts as a way to overwhelm you. Even if your friend—despite engaging in more
thorough and accurate information processing—is equally overwhelmed, they might
still say: “Wow, I didn’t understand any of that!” This is likely to alter reactions to
overload by alleviating social pressure to go ahead with the transaction anyway.
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Jonas & Frey, supra note 72, at 164–66; see Kray, supra note 117, at 98.
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687–89 (2011). In the financial context, increasing the number of
investment options in a retirement plan generally suppresses enrollment. When there are too
many choices, people prefer not to invest the time they think is necessary to make the choice,
and hence don’t make any decision at all. Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman & Wei Jiang,
How Much Choice Is Too Much?: Contributions to 401 (K) Retirement Plans, in PENSION
DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAV. FIN. 83, 88–91 (Olivia S. Mitchell &
Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004).
122
Evan Polman, Effects of Self—Other Decision Making on Regulatory Focus and
Choice Overload, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 980, 983 (2012) [hereinafter Polman,
Effects of Self] (supporting this conclusion when deciding for others). Similarly, offering
advisors more choices should increase their satisfaction with their advice, even though
expanding the choice set tends to decrease the decider’s satisfaction with their choice. See
id.
123
See Evan Polman & Kathleen D. Vohs, Decision Fatigue, Choosing for Others, and
Self-Construal, 7 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 471, 476 (2016) (finding that, when
deciding for others, people who see themselves as relatively independent suffered less
decision fatigue).
124
Wray & Stone, supra note 13, at 125, 129–32.
125
This does not mean advisors will always avoid overload problems. Some studies
suggest that these problems will reappear when the advisor is told that they must justify their
advice to a third party. See Polman, Effects of Self, supra note 122, at 987–88 (finding that,
when deciding for others, choice overload only occurred when a third party would read their
reported justifications for the choice).
121
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Having a friend say this will make you more willing to admit that you, too, need
more time to consider the investment.
5. Literacy, Numeracy, and Experience
Although advisors will often try harder to understand and process relevant
information, they may run into the limits of their own literacy or numeracy.126 Recall
the parable that began this section: “[I]f the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into
the ditch.”127 If we take this parable literally, rather than in the metaphorical sense it
was intended, we might picture a line of people falling into a ditch one after the
other, like dominos.128 The reality is likely to be much different.129 At the very least,
the first blind person to fall in the ditch is likely to shout “There’s a ditch here, watch
out!” at which point the others may well avoid falling. The leader may also be
familiar with the terrain, in which case she can easily sidestep the ditch and guide
others to do the same. Each case highlights the role of experience in helping
overcome one’s inability to see certain hazards.
Similarly, people can learn from experience regardless of their literacy or
numeracy. Experience concretizes lessons and allows us to synthesize a huge
quantity of information. Many scholars have wondered whether Miranda warnings
should be simplified to make them easier to understand.130 This might help. But
experience might well be a better teacher. It might tell you not to talk to the police.
Advice can harness that experience. Suppose the police could not question you until
after they read you the Miranda warnings and you called two friends to receive
advice. What might those friends say? Probably something like: “Keep your mouth
shut.” This suggests that we might make more rational decisions if mandatory
disclosures were coupled with advice.
Experience also captures unique information. The overwhelming majority of
payday borrowers report that the relevant loan terms are fairly clear.131 But those
terms are only the starting point to understanding the effects of the loan. People with
experience may have specific information that borrowers could not glean from the
contract terms, no matter how literate and numerate they were. Borrowers report that
126
For a discussion of literacy and numeracy, see Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note
121, at 711–16 and BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 80–91.
127
Matthew 15:14 (King James).
128
This seems to be the case in Pieter Bruegel’s 1568 painting entitled The Blind
Leading the Blind.
129
Emily Underwood, How Blind People Use Batlike Sonar, SCIENCE (Nov. 11, 2014),
at http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/11/how-blind-people-use-batlike-sonar [https://
perma.cc/48KL-FWFG].
130
See Ferguson & Leo, supra note 11, at 938, 959–60.
131
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA, REPORT 2: HOW
BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 17 (2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2013/02/20/pew_choosing_borrowing_payday_feb2013-(1).pdf [https://perm
a.cc/8KKC-PBPG] (reporting that 75–88% of borrowers thought the terms and conditions of
payday loans were clear versus very or somewhat confusing).
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different lenders are differentially likely to renegotiate terms once the borrower falls
behind on payments.132 Some auto title borrowers may believe that lenders will not
exercise their full repossession rights. In some cases, they may be right, but in others,
lenders might repossess a car even if you only miss one payment. Local norms, or
even tendencies personal to individual lenders, might be as important as the formal
contract terms.
More generally, borrowers develop rough affective responses to these loans.
Fifty-two percent of auto title borrowers think that lenders took advantage of them,
and thirty-three percent think that auto title loans hurt people more than they help
them.133 Even if they cannot precisely say why, and even if they cannot precisely
report how much money they have spent to service the loan, their overall sense of
the loan product condenses a near-infinite set of product attributes into a gut reaction
that can communicate important information about the borrower’s experience.
Advice that is rooted in experience also has benefits when we turn our attention
to advice-taking. Advice from someone who lost their car after taking out an auto
title loan not only communicates risk information, it does so in a particularly
effective way: through stories of real people. Studies of risk communication
consistently show that narratives are far more effective than statistics.134 A
disclosure might warn you that the lender has the right to repossess your car, and
that warning may do some good. But people will be significantly more likely to pay
attention to personal stories from the “nearly 1 in 5” borrowers who actually had
their car repossessed.135

132

STEPHEN NUÑEZ, KELSEY SCHABERG, RICHARD HENDRA, LISA SERVON, MINA
ADDO & ANDREA MAPILLERO-COLOMINA, ONLINE PAYDAY AND INSTALLMENT LOANS:
WHO USES THEM AND WHY? 52 (MDRC 2016), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/
online_payday_2016_FR.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7T4-S27U].
133
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AUTO TITLE LOANS: MARKET PRACTICES AND
BORROWERS’ EXPERIENCES 15 (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/03/
autotitleloansreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T5K-Z6YN].
134
John B.F. De Wit, Enny Das & Raymond Vet, What Works Best: Objective Statistics
or a Personal Testimonial? An Assessment of the Persuasive Effects of Different Types of
Message Evidence on Risk Perception, 27 HEALTH PSYCH. 110, 110, 113 (2008) (finding
that narratives are more impactful than statistics at increasing risk perception); Victoria A.
Shaffer & Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, All Stories Are Not Alike: A Purpose-, Content-, and
Valence-Based Taxonomy of Patient Narratives in Decision Aids, 33 MED. DECISION
MAKING 4, 4 (2013) (noting that narrative approaches to health-education are controversial
precisely because they are thought to be too influential compared to statistics).
135
ANN BADDOUR, JAMIE TEGELER-SAUER & DEBORAH FOWLER, TEX. APPLESEED,
PAYDAY
AND
AUTO
TITLE
LENDING
IN
TEXAS
3
(2016),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Payday-Auto-Title-Lending-Tx_MktOvTrends2012-2015Rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C3B-YYYF]. Borrowers may also want to
know the identity of those lenders who try to use the threat of criminal charges to extract
payments. Vine v. PLS Fin. Servs., Inc., 689 F. App’x 800, 802 (5th Cir. 2017) (describing
the practice of some payday lenders who report borrowers to the local district attorney for
writing bad checks if they default).
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Of course, not all people will have friends with relevant experience. But there
is a convenient relationship between how dangerous a course of action is and how
useful advice might be. As a consumer loan product becomes more dangerous in the
sense that it ensnares more people, for example, it is more likely that there will be
someone who can help point out its negative potential. A similar result is likely to
occur even if the product harms very few people, if it does a great deal of harm to
this small group. As the magnitude of the negative effect increases, more people who
were not directly affected are likely to take notice. Because people will seek advice
from those who are likely to be most helpful, they will be looking for advisors who
have direct or indirect experience.136 This makes it more likely that those seeking
advice about a predatory loan product, a bank’s overdraft fees, a credit card’s late
fees, or any other hidden feature of a contract will hear a relevant cautionary tale.137
B. Getting Advice: Will People Listen?
There are several lines of research that explore advice-taking. Much of this
research focuses on how to design more effective advice messages.138
Communications scholars have developed Advice Response Theory, which teases
out various aspects of advice that make it more effective.139 For example, they might
examine the effect of politeness or padding advice with statements of emotional
support.140 These scholars also examine dynamics related to gender or perceived
trustworthiness.141 Scholars of linguistics dissect actual advice-producing
conversations in an effort to help counselors and doctors advise their patients more

136
Erina L. MacGeorge, Bo Feng & Lisa M. Guntzviller, Advice: Expanding the
Communication Paradigm, in COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 40 213, 223 (Elisia L. Cohen
ed., 2016) (noting that “recipients tend to select advisors they perceive to have relevant
expertise”); Lyn M. Van Swol, Jihyun Esther Paik & Andrew Prahl, Advice Recipients: The
Psychology of Advice Utilization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ADVICE 21, 27 (Erina L.
MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol eds., 2018) (noting that advisees “are more likely to seek
out advice from advisors who offer [advisees] information they do not know than information
to which they have already been exposed”). Although advisees are often unable to identify
experts, they can often identify people who are more knowledgeable than themselves. Albert
E. Mannes, Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, The Wisdom of Select Crowds, 107 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 276, 286 (2014).
137
Of course, it is harder to find experienced advisors in some contexts. Retirement
may be one. Many people may not realize their mistakes until decades later. Further, some
social barriers exist to forming the necessary intergenerational friendships that might
promote good retirement advice. Even if a younger person is friends with people with this
relevant experience, they may discount the advice. After all, the advisor grew up in a different
era, with different economic conditions, etc.
138
MacGeorge et al., supra note 136, at 214.
139
Id. at 216.
140
Id. at 215–16.
141
Id. at 216.
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effectively.142 These nuanced issues are interesting and important.143 But this Part is
concerned with the big-picture question of whether people listen to advice at all, not
how to tweak advice at the margins. Research within psychology offers the most
direct assessment of this question. The bulk of this literature seeks to measure the
extent to which people follow advice. The punchline is twofold. First, people
incorporate advice and improve their decisions. Second, people could do better; they
hew too much toward their initial opinion and don’t give advice the full weight that
it deserves.
Advice works. Numerous lab studies find that advice improves decisionmaking.144 In order to show this, researchers need a way to measure how much
influence advice has. This impacts how the studies are designed. In a common
research design, subjects are asked to answer a set of questions with correct
numerical answers like the dates that historical events occurred, the number of
calories in certain foods, or the distance between two cities.145 After giving an initial
answer, they are provided with advice about the correct answer, ostensibly from a
peer.146 Researchers can then measure whether and how much subjects alter their
initial responses.147 The consistent finding of numerous studies is that people take
advice into account and use it to improve their answers.148
Related work in economics also finds that advice is helpful. “[A]dvice is a very
powerful force in shaping the decisions that people make and tends to push those
decisions in the direction of the predictions of rational theory.”149 For example, in a
study where participants had to make choices about entering a tournament, advice
significantly improved self-sorting.150 About twice the number of strong-performing
women entered the tournament after receiving advice, and about half as many weakperforming men entered after they received advice.151 Advice has also been shown

142

Id. at 218, 221, 227–28.
For example, it is important to know whether emotional support helps people follow
advice, and if so whether those emotional supports should come before or after. Id. at 216
(“[A]dvice offered following emotional support and problem analysis messages is perceived
as higher in quality, more facilitative of the recipient’s coping, and leads to stronger
implementation intention than advice that does not follow this sequential pattern.”).
144
Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 129–30,
133.
145
See id. at 138; see also Robertson, supra note 5, at 701 (using estimation of how
much money is in a jar).
146
Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 138.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Schotter, supra note 26, at 196 (collecting studies).
150
Jordi Brandts, Valeska Groenert & Christina Rott, The Impact of Advice on Women’s
and Men’s Selection into Competition, 61 MGMT. SCI. 1018, 1018 (2015).
151
Id. at 1030–31 (using advice from another subject, but one who had gone through
one tournament already).
143
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to improve performance over and above the learning that advisees gain from
observing what others have done.152
If anything, these studies understate the power of advice. Three factors support
this. First, they often use relatively low-salience outcomes like small cash payouts.153
Second, they use anonymous advice from strangers.154 Third, and relatedly, they use
simple written advice rather than advice that is embedded in more complex
conversations.155
What if the stakes were higher, either because subjects could earn more money
or because the advice concerned courses of action that were more emotionally
salient? In both cases, the advisee might be under a great deal more stress. Other
psychological research shows that this will increase advice-taking. People tend to
give greater weight to advice when the task at hand is difficult and when they are
experiencing heightened anxiety.156 Further suggestive evidence comes from
medical decision-making, an area where people are likely to be under a great deal of
stress while dealing with important issues. There, patients crave advice and many
even want their doctor to make the relevant decision for them.157 This suggests that
people will readily take advice about important real-world decisions. The limited
field research supports this claim. Research into corporate decision-making suggests
that advice improves corporate performance.158 Seeking advice from those inside the
firm helps, but seeking advice from outsiders is even more helpful.159 Advice is
valuable for a number of reasons. Here, the researchers identified one particularly
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See Boğaçhan Çelen, Shachar Kariv & Andrew Schotter, An Experimental Test of
Advice and Social Learning, 56 MGMT. SCI. 1687, 1700 (2010).
153
See, e.g., Brandts, supra note 150, at 1023 (using undergraduates who earned an
average of roughly 18 euros each).
154
Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 138–39.
155
Id. at 138; see, e.g., Brandts, supra note 150, at 1020–21.
156
Francesca Gino & Don A. Moore, Effects of Task Difficulty on Use of Advice, 20 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 21, 21 (2007); Francesca Gino, Alison Wood Brooks & Maurice
E. Schweitzer, Anxiety, Advice, and the Ability to Discern: Feeling Anxious Motivates
Individuals to Seek and Use Advice, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 497, 497 (2012).
157
Neeraj K. Arora & Colleen A. McHorney, Patient Preferences for Medical Decision
Making: Who Really Wants to Participate?, 38 MED. CARE 335, 335–36 (2000) (reporting
that 69% of patients wanted to leave the final decision to their doctor); John D. Lantos, Do
Patients Want to Participate in Decisions About Their Own Medical Care?, 15 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2015) (reporting a 1984 survey that found “[e]ighty percent of the patients
preferred to have their clinicians make the therapeutic decisions”); Mellina da Silva Terres,
Cristiane Pizzutti dos Santos & Kenny Basso, Antecedents of the Client’s Trust in LowVersus High-Consequence Decisions, 29 J. SERVS. MKTG. 26, 27 (2015) (finding that, as the
decision becomes more impactful, people’s desire for autonomy and responsibility is reduced
and they start experiencing the negative emotions stemming from having to choose).
158
Philip Meissner & Torsten Wulf, Debiasing Illusion of Control in Individual
Judgment: The Role of Internal and External Advice Seeking, 10 REV. MANAGERIAL SCI.
245, 248 (2016).
159
Id. at 250–51.
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important aspect: advice can mitigate over-optimism and a manager’s tendency to
think that they can control outcomes.160
People are also likely to give more weight to advice from friends and family,
compared to unsolicited advice from anonymous strangers. We might (rightly) think
that ignoring advice from friends and family could do some damage to those social
relationships. If so, then we might be more likely to seriously consider advice.
People are more likely to solicit advice from friends and family than strangers, and
people tend to follow solicited advice more than unsolicited advice.161
Finally, friends and family can and do present advice in ways that can bolster
its effectiveness. They do not merely write a recommendation on a post-it note and
stick it on your car. They pair advice with emotional support (“I know this must be
hard for you . . . .”), encouragement (“You got this!”), new questions (“Have you
thought about . . . .”), follow-ups (“What did you decide?”), and much more. They
may also provide reasons and arguments in favor of their advice. Research has found
that many of these features of natural advice enhance its impact.162
The studies above show that advice works. But we might worry about whether
there will be a lot of noise in real-world advice. Some of it might be bad, after all,
160

Id.
See Lyn M. Van Swol, Jihyun Esther Paik & Andrew Prahl, Linguistic Influences
on the Outcomes of Imposed Advice, 39 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 318, 319 (2020)
(“[R]ecipients often react most negatively to imposed advice, probably because it threatens
their sense of autonomy and competence. Unsolicited and unwanted advice is less likely to
be utilized and is perceived as lower quality than solicited and wanted advice.”). Note that
advice does not fit the neat binary of solicited or not, but rather falls on a spectrum. For
example, telling someone about a problem might be an implicit request for advice.
162
Kasey A. Foley, Erina L. MacGeorge, David L. Brinker, Yuwei Li & Yanmengqian
Zhou, Health Providers’ Advising on Symptom Management for Upper Respiratory Tract
Infections: Does Elaboration of Reasoning Influence Outcomes Relevant to Antibiotic
Stewardship?, 39 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 349, 349 (2020) (reason-giving); Erina
MacGeorge, Lisa M. Guntzviller, Kellie S. Brisini, Loren C. Bailey, Sara K. Salmon,
Kaytiann Severen, Sara E. Branch, Helen M. Lillie, Cynthia K. Lindley, Rebekah G. Pastor
& Ryan D. Cummings, The Influence of Emotional Support Quality on Advice Evaluation
and Outcomes, 65 COMMC’N Q. 80, 80 (2017) (emotional support); Dalal & Bonaccio, supra
note 22, at 17 (finding that statements of social support were just as important as
recommendations in predicting whether advice was perceived as helpful); see id. at 21
(“[D]ecision-makers appeared to want their advisors to provide information about the
alternatives.”); Geoffrey L. Cohen & David K. Sherman, The Psychology of Change: SelfAffirmation and Social Psychological Intervention, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 333, 340 (2014)
(affirmations of self-worth); Steffen Altmann & Christian Traxler, Nudges at the Dentist, 72
EUR. ECON. REV. 19, 20 (2014) (finding that reminders double the number of people who
make dental appointments); Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis, Nikos Zourbanos, Evangelos Galanis
& Yiannis Theodorakis, Self-Talk and Sports Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 6 PERSPS.
PSYCH. SCI. 348, 349 (2011) (encouragement). This may be why peer advice can be just as
useful as expert advice in some settings. Hans-Martin Von Gaudecker, How Does Household
Portfolio Diversification Vary with Financial Literacy and Financial Advice?, 70 J. FIN. 489,
498–99 (2015) (finding that advice from friends was just as good as expert advice at leading
people to diversify their holdings, even for people with low numeracy).
161
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and when bad advice “works” it makes matters worse. Luckily, people seem to have
a decently good feel for separating bad advice from good advice.
People respond sensibly to various features of the advice context. They discount
advice based solely on a “gut feeling” unless the person is particularly
experienced.163 Although people can and do follow bad advice,164 they also tend to
be suspicious of it. They discount bad advice more than good advice and are quick
to discount advice from sources that have proven to be unreliable in the past.165 Even
three- to six-year-olds can distinguish bad advice from good.166 In a recent study of
peer financial advice, both advice to be impatient and advice to be patient had an
effect, but advice to be patient had a far more powerful impact.167 This again
suggests that advisees can sensibly filter advice. Advisees also sensibly respond to
aggregating advice. If accuracy is your goal, one of the main benefits of advice is
that it can be aggregated. Why seek advice from one person when you can ask two
(or three or five)? People intuitively understand that aggregating multiple pieces of
advice can lead to better guidance.168 They don’t give multiple pieces of advice the
full extra weight they deserve,169 but they are generally on the right track in thinking
163
Stefanie C. Tzioti, Berend Wierenga & Stijn M. J. Van Osselaer, The Effect of
Intuitive Advice Justification on Advice Taking, 27 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 66, 70–72
(2014).
164
Thomas Schultze, Andreas Mojzisch & Stefan Schulz-Hardt, On the Inability to
Ignore Useless Advice: A Case for Anchoring in the Judge-Advisor-System, 64
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 170, 171 (2017) (noting that other studies have found people tend to
put about a 20% weight on advice from people who performed very badly on previous trials).
165
Sunita Sah, Don A. Moore & Robert J. MacCoun, Cheap Talk and Credibility: The
Consequences of Confidence and Accuracy on Advisor Credibility and Persuasiveness, 121
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 246, 246 (2013).
166
Hannes Rakoczy, Christoph Ehrling, Paul L. Harris & Thomas Schultze, Young
Children Heed Advice Selectively, 138 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCH. 71, 74–78 (2015)
(finding that these children revised their answers about how much food an animal needs to
eat after receiving adult advice, and weighed that advice differently depending on whether
the adult named the animal correctly or said in the past “I don’t know what that animal is
called”).
167
Nicole Senecal, Teresa Wang, Elizabeth Thompson & Joseph W. Kable, Normative
Arguments from Experts and Peers Reduce Delay Discounting, 7 JUDGMENT & DECISION
MAKING 566, 580 (2012).
168
Albert E. Mannes, Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, The Wisdom of Select Crowds,
107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 276, 287, 288 (2014) (choosing to take the average of 5
predictions); Mandy Hütter & Fabian Ache, Seeking Advice: A Sampling Approach to Advice
Taking, 11 J. JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 401, 408 (2016) (finding that people choose
to look at 10 pieces of advice before making their decision).
169
See, e.g., Ilan Yaniv & Maxim Milyavsky, Using Advice from Multiple Sources to
Revise and Improve Judgments, 103 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 104, 109
(2007) (finding that there is not much difference between providing 2 pieces of advice and
8—the former increased accuracy by 27% while the latter did so only by 33%); Thomas
Schultze, Andreas Mojzisch & Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Groups Weight Outside Information
Less than Individuals Do Because They Should: Response to Minson and Mueller (2012), 24
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that multiple pieces of advice are more helpful than one.170 Again, this certainly does
not mean people will never get or follow bad advice. They will.171 But it does suggest
that advisees will be more impacted by good advice than bad.
The main problem with advice is that we often miss opportunities to use it to
its fullest potential. Most research that seeks to quantify the influence of advice finds
that the best strategy is to weigh your initial opinion and the advisory one equally
by averaging them.172 But only about 20 percent of people do that.173 Approximately
40 percent of people ignore advice entirely.174 About 10 percent of people adopt the
advice completely and ignore their opinion entirely.175 The other 30 percent tend to
weigh both opinions, but give too much weight to their own.176
PSYCH. SCI. 1371, 1371 (2013) (finding that both individuals and dyads ignore the extra
weight that a single piece of advice from a dyad should get over and above advice generated
by an individual).
170
Yaniv & Milyavsky, supra note 169, at 109.
171
Lyn M. Van Swol, Forecasting Another’s Enjoyment Versus Giving the Right
Answer: Trust, Shared Values, Task Effects, and Confidence in Improving the Acceptance of
Advice, 27 INT’L J. FORECASTING 103, 109, 115 (2011) (“Although decision-makers were
more likely to accept advice from high expertise advisors, they still” accepted advice on a
cognitively demanding math task even when they knew the advisor was from the lowest
performing quartile during the previous round).
172
Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, Strategies for Revising Judgment: How (and How
Well) People Use Others’ Opinions, 35 J. EXP. PSYCH: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION
780, 786 (2009).
173
Id. at 786–87.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.; see also Rakoczy et al., supra note 166, at 81–82 and Mannes et al., supra note
168, at 287. Overall, this pattern is called “egocentric advice discounting.” Bonaccio &
Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 129. Of course, this label
obscures not only the pattern in the text, but others. Not all people use advice to the same
degree. Narcissists tend to think that advice is low quality, but they still respond to accurate
advice. People who feel powerful discount advice, but they still give it some weight. People
who are socially ostracized discount advice from others. Edgar E. Kausel, Satoris S.
Culbertson, Pedro I. Leiva, Jerel E. Slaughter & Alexander T. Jackson, Too Arrogant for
Their Own Good? Why and When Narcissists Dismiss Advice, 131 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 33, 38 (2015); Leigh Plunkett Tost, Francesca Gino & Richard P.
Larrick, Power, Competitiveness, and Advice Taking: Why the Powerful Don’t Listen, 117
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 53, 57 (2012); Kelly E. See, Elizabeth W.
Morrison, Naomi B. Rothman & Jack B. Soll, The Detrimental Effects of Power on
Confidence, Advice Taking, and Accuracy, 116 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
272, 272 (2011); Kaileigh A. Byrne, Thomas P. Tibbett, Lauren N. Laserna, Adrienne R.
Carter-Sowell & Darrell A. Worthy, Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from
Others During Decision Making, 29 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 409, 409 (2016); see also
Bradford L. Barham, Jean-Paul Chavas, Dylan Fitz & Laura Schechter, Receptiveness to
Advice, Cognitive Ability, and Technology Adoption, 149 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 239, 256–
57 (2018) (finding that advice-taking propensity can differ depending on the cognitive ability
of the advisee).
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Of course, there are other imperfections in advice-taking. Advisees give more
weight to advice that aligns with their preferred course of action.177 They also
sometimes mistake confidence for competence,178 overly discount outlier advice,179
and can get overloaded when presented with too much information.180 This literature
is relatively young.181 Accordingly, there is more work to be done exploring advicetaking in more nuanced ways. For example, studying advice between spouses or
advice within online forums may reveal unique patterns,182 the timing of advice may
alter its effect,183 and other situational or dispositional factors may affect advicetaking.184
Despite these shortfalls, the literature reveals that peer advice is highly useful,
and that it could be even more useful if people didn’t put special weight on their own
opinions.185

177

See Tomasz Zaleskiewicz, Agata Gasiorowska, Katarzyna Stasiuk, Renata
Maksymiuk & Yoram Bar-Tal, Lay Evaluation of Financial Experts: The Action Advice
Effect and Confirmation Bias, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1476, 1476 (2016); Tomasz
Zaleskiewicz & Agata Gasiorowska, Evaluating Experts May Serve Psychological Needs:
Self-Esteem, Bias Blind Spot, and Processing Fluency Explain Confirmation Effect in
Assessing Financial Advisors’ Authority, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: APPLIED 2 (2020),
Advance online publication, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xap0000308 [https://perma.cc/Q5CL3W3P] (“[D]ecision-makers, when evaluating the financial expertise of prospective advisors,
are vulnerable to preferring advice that is consistent, as opposed to inconsistent, with their
own beliefs.”).
178
Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note 116, at 132.
179
Id. at 131.
180
Foley et al., supra note 162, at 367.
181
Erina L. MacGeorge, Communicating Advice: Introduction to the Special Issue, 39
J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH. 287, 288 (2020) (noting that much of the literature is only
twenty years old); see Bonaccio & Dalal, Advice Taking and Decision-Making, supra note
116, at 128 (noting that this paper, in 2006, was the first to survey the field).
182
MacGeorge, supra note 181, at 289 (identifying these as promising areas of future
research).
183
See generally Christina A. Rader, Jack B. Soll & Richard P. Larrick, Pushing Away
from Representative Advice: Advice Taking, Anchoring, and Adjustment, 130 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 26 (2015) (comparing the effects of opinion formation before
receiving advice with receiving advice before opinion formation).
184
See Soll & Larrick, supra note 172.
185
How could you ensure that you use advice to its fullest potential? Put on a blindfold.
Suppose you have to estimate the number of calories in a particular meal. You’ll be much
more accurate if you put on a blindfold and ask others to give you estimates. Then you’ll
have no choice but to average the guesses. If you peek, you’ll make your own estimate, and
you’re likely to give it far too much weight. See, e.g., Ilan Yaniv & Shoham Choshen‐Hillel,
Exploiting the Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces
Egocentrism and Increases Accuracy, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 427, 428–31 (2012).

2021]

ADVICE

415

C. Summary
Advice works. The literature on advice-taking consistently finds that advice
improves decision-making, even in situations where advice should be at its weakest:
anonymous advice from a stranger whose credibility you cannot assess. Peer advice
in the real world is likely to be more impactful.
This impact is likely to be highly positive. Advisors are likely to recommend
significantly better decisions than they or the advisee would otherwise make.
“Better” is often relatively easy to define. Normatively, it is better to take probability
into account in risky decisions than to ignore it. It is better to take relevant
information into account rather than systematically ignore it when it conflicts with
your intuitive choice.186 Taking on the role of an advisor may also affect decisionmaking in ways that have more ambiguous welfare effects,187 and of course, more
186

Of course, it is possible to construct a hypothetical person who is so haunted by
anticipated regret and doubt in the face of options that it would be better for them to take the
first mortgage offer they receive even if it means spending hundreds of thousands of dollars
more over the term of the loan. For an overview of the much milder real-world version of
this, see generally Arne Roets, Barry Schwartz & Yanjun Guan, The Tyranny of Choice: A
Cross-Cultural Investigation of Maximizing-Satisficing Effects on Well-Being, 7 JUDGMENT
& DECISION MAKING 689 (2012).
187
There are some situations where it is harder, but still possible, to say that the
advisor’s recommendation is better than the choice the decider is likely to make without
advice. Consider preferences surrounding risk. It is perfectly rational to have low or high risk
aversion. It’s just a matter of taste. Although there is no research on how risk preferences
change when people offer advice, there is research on risk preferences when people make
decisions for others. It turns out that decisions for others and decisions for oneself treat risk
differently. When deciding for others, people tend to be more risk averse when the decision
implicates physical safety, more risk-seeking for romantic decisions, and more risk neutral
for monetary decisions. See Sujoy Chakravarty, Glenn W. Harrison, Ernan E. Haruvy & E.
Elisabet Rutström, Are You Risk Averse over Other People’s Money?, 77 S. ECON. J. 901,
911 (2011) (money); Evan Polman & Kaiyang Wu, Decision Making for Others Involving
Risk: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 77 J. ECON. PSYCH. 102184, 3 (2020) (collecting studies
on romantic choices and safety choices). There are three interpretations for this pattern that
offer reasons to think that decisions for others are better. The first is that visceral emotions
distort risk preferences, and decisions for others involve fewer of such distortions. Id. at 3
(describing the “risk as feeling” explanation). The second interpretation of these findings is
that, when deciding for others, people make choices that are more influenced by social
norms. Id. Social norms might dictate that it is better to take a chance and ask someone out
on a date, even though you might get rejected. Social norms might say that risking death is
rarely if ever worth it, and that risk neutrality is the best way to build wealth. Decisions for
others (and perhaps advice) will be better only when the relevant social norms align with
one’s normative judgment about which decisions are better. A third interpretation of this
pattern in risk preferences is that, when deciding for others, people use their own ideal self
as a guide. See Jennifer L. Howell, Kate Sweeny & James A. Shepperd, Psychological
Distance and the Discrepancy Between Recommendations and Actions, 36 BASIC & APP.
SOC. PSYCH. 502, 503 (2014) (finding that “people lean toward recommendations for others
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research is needed. This future research might reveal more nuanced patterns,188 and
should test advice in more real-world settings. Regardless, the overall picture,
although necessarily preliminary, is incredibly promising.
that match their perception of ideal behavior”) (citations omitted). There is an interesting
convergence in the research. Decisions for others, decisions for your future self, and
statements about what your ideal self would do all appear to align. Eric R. Stone & Liz
Allgaier, A Social Values Analysis of Self–Other Differences in Decision Making Involving
Risk, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 114, 119 (2008); Emily Pronin, Christopher Y.
Olivola & Kathleen A. Kennedy, Doing unto Future Selves as You Would Do unto Others:
Psychological Distance and Decision Making, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 224,
224 (2008); Polman & Emich, supra note 14, at 493; Eric R. Stone, YoonSun Choi, Wändi
Bruine de Bruin & David R. Mandel, I Can Take the Risk, but You Should Be Safe: SelfOther Differences in Situations Involving Physical Safety, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING
250, 252–55 (2013). This suggests that advisors are recommending actions that they
themselves judge to be better. This is not a guarantee that they are better by whatever
yardstick the policymaker prefers, but it is at least suggestive. It aligns with the view that
welfare should be measured by the satisfaction of ideal preferences rather than actual (and
often fleeting) ones. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 111, at 38.
There are some situations where it is very difficult to say which decision is better.
Consider non-risky choices: People weigh aspects of a decision differently depending on
whether they are deciding for themselves or for others. For example, when deciding on which
restaurant to go to, you might consider both the quality of the food and how far away it is.
When deciding for others, people might place extra weight on food quality, and less weight
on distance. Jingyi Lu, Xiaofei Xie & Jingzhe Xu, Desirability or Feasibility: Self–Other
Decision-Making Differences, 39 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 144, 146–48 (2013).
It’s not clear which weighting is better. Here, I only make a weak claim: that advice in this
context will not be welfare reducing precisely because we cannot say with confidence that
one decision is better than the other. If advice is harmless in some areas, and highly useful
in others, it is still quite useful overall. It may also be possible to tailor interventions such
that policymakers promote advice only in situations where its welfare effects are clearest
(and large and positive), and not when they are more ambiguous.
188
For example, more work could be done to tease out how and whether a potential
advisor’s personality traits affect their advice. For some examples of this type of research in
the adjacent field of deciding for others, see Polman & Vohs, supra note 123, at 475 (finding
that people who differ on a scale of independence/interdependence feel differently about
making decisions for others); Polman & Wu, supra note 187, at 13, 16 (noting that different
groups of people use different strategies when deciding for others). Future research should
also explore more dynamic advice situations, where people give and get advice from one
another multiple times. Fabian Ache, Christina Rader & Mandy Hütter, Advisors Want Their
Advice to Be Used–But Not Too Much: An Interpersonal Perspective on Advice Taking, 89
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 13 (2020) (finding that, for difficult tasks where advisors
lack confidence in the accuracy of their advice, advisors don’t want their opinions weighed
heavily and are less willing to give advice in the future when they are); Hayley Blunden &
Francesca Gino, How the Other Half Thinks: The Psychology of Advising, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ADVICE 43, 52 (Erina L. MacGeorge & Lyn M. Van Swol eds., 2018) (“When
individuals are asked for advice, it causes them to feel powerful, and when individuals feel
powerful, they are likely to enact scripts related to having power.”); Queen et al., supra note
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Advice-giving is a powerful and as-yet-unrecognized debiasing tool. The
psychological distance between advisors and advisees allows advisors to see the big
picture, avoid distorting emotions, and give advice that is untainted by hyperbolic
discounting, betrayal aversion, omission bias, and attribution errors. Advisors try
harder, more -rationally invest in searching for and processing information, and are
less susceptible to overload effects. Even advisors without the necessary literacy or
numeracy to understand contracts or government disclosures will often have
something more valuable: concrete experience. Overall, people who take the
perspective of the advisor are not blind, and they can offer valuable guidance to
those of us who are.
III. PROMOTING ADVICE
At this point, a skeptic may ask: “If advice is so useful, why do you think that
people are currently underutilizing it?” There are reasons to doubt that people seek
advice as often as they should. First, people don’t have as many friends as they used
to. Second, people seem especially disinclined to talk about money. These barriers
have to be overcome in order for advice to fulfill its full promise.
We just don’t have as many close friends today as we used to. Thirty-five years
ago, only about 10 percent of the population indicated that they had no one that they
talked to about important matters.189 As of 2004, that number had gone up to 25
percent.190 These numbers are even starker when we exclude family. More than half
of Americans have no non-family members to talk to about important matters: no
coworkers; no neighbors; no friends.191 Others have identified those with no
confidants or only one confidant as having “inadequate counseling support.”192
Almost half of Americans fell into this category in 2004.193 A more recent study in
2009 found similar results.194
29, at 386 (“[M]ost everyday and more consequential decisions occur over weeks and
months, and understanding how couples move in and out of dyadic processes would help to
address when intimate partners can be most helpful.”). Age may also be relevant to advicegiving or advice-taking. Fabio Del Missier, Timo Mäntylä & Lars-Göran Nilsson, Aging,
Memory, and Decision-Making, in AGING AND DECISION MAKING: EMPIRICAL AND APPLIED
PERSPECTIVES 127, 141 (Thomas Hess, JoNell Strough & Corinna E. Löckenhoff eds., 2015)
(noting that “aging is associated with many changes in memory processes, which can
influence judgment and decision making in complex ways”).
189
Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin & Matthew E. Brashears, Social Isolation in
America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks over Two Decades, 71 AM. SOCIO. REV.
353, 358 (2006).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 371.
193
Id.
194
Keith N. Hampton, Lauren F. Sessions, Eun Ja Her & Lee Rainie, Social Isolation
and New Technology: How the Internet and Mobile Phones Impact Americans’ Social
Networks, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 19–21 (2009) (finding that although
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Even among people with plenty of available friends and family, some topics
are hard to talk about. Money often tops the list of difficult things to talk about,
beating out death, religion, and politics.195 Pause a moment and ask yourself the
following questions: How much money does your best friend make? How much was
his or her house? How much have they saved for retirement? I doubt many of us
know the answers to these questions. (Unless of course, you are a law student, in
which case the answers are likely to be zero, not applicable, and zero. But other
information is sensitive. Do you know your best friend’s GPA, student loan amount,
or her loan’s interest rate?) Because money is often seen as a proxy for power,
happiness, and personal efficacy, talking about money can bring up all sorts of
insecurities and jealousies, and may threaten the implied equality in friendships.196
Although millennials might be more willing to discuss money compared to previous
generations, it’s a sensitive subject for everyone.197
Given these barriers to advice-seeking,198 actively promoting advice might
substantially increase its use. A full cost benefit analysis of when and how to
promote advice is beyond the scope of this Article, in part because more research
would be needed to do so. The advice literature itself is still growing, and will benefit
from studies that examine its general patterns in more nuanced ways.199 More
importantly, now that the potential of peer advice is clear, researchers should turn to
examining how advice might interact with other tools for promoting welfare, such
as mandated disclosures and nudges. Advice alone is no panacea. In some
circumstances, advisors might need mandated disclosure in order to generate good
advice.200 It is possible that mandated disclosures should be designed differently if
they are targeting both a decider and an advice-giver. Advice may also interact with

just 12% of the population had no confidant in 2008, 47% had one or fewer confidants,
consistent with the 2004 study). Of course, this does not mean that people are hermits. Only
about 5% of people have no friends that they talk to weekly. Hu Wang & Barry Wellman,
Social Connectivity in America: Changes in Adult Friendship Network Size from 2002 to
2007, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1148, 1155 (2010). But when it comes to getting advice
about life’s big decisions, data on closer friendships is probably more relevant.
195
Chris Taylor, The Last Taboo: Why Nobody Talks About Money, REUTERS (Mar. 27,
2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-money-conversation/the-last-taboo-why-nobodytalks-about-money-idUSBREA2Q1UN20140327 [https://perma.cc/M6LS-22T9].
196
See Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 633, 646 (2007)
(discussing equality norms among friends).
197
Dan Kadlec, Is It Rude to Talk About Money? Millennials Don’t Think So, MONEY
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://money.com/millennials-money-manners/ [https://perma.cc/NL4BSAWS].
198
There may also be barriers to advice-giving and ways to promote it, but this Part
focuses predominately on advice-seeking. It does so in part because unsolicited advice is
often less effective than solicited advice. See Van Swol et al., supra note 161, at 319.
199
See supra notes 137–87 and accompanying text.
200
For a discussion of why sophisticated intermediators might not need mandated
disclosure, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 185–88.
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classic nudges.201 Advice is likely to strengthen the impact of social norms nudges.202
But it may work against the power of default rules.203 Advice may also interact with
other biases or psychological tendencies.204 Again, more research is needed before
designing specific policies. Nonetheless, the power of advice highlights the
productive potential of this research and the desirability of offering at least a
preliminary sketch of how policymakers could tap into peer advice.
This Part sketches several broad ways of promoting advice: (a) advising people
to seek advice; (b) advising them to simulate advice by, for example, asking them to
ask themselves what their spouse might say about the relevant decision; (c)
mandating that consumers have the opportunity to seek advice; (d) incentivizing
advice; (e) mandating advice; and (f) facilitating norms conducive to advice. This
Part also examines ways that advice, or the opportunity to receive it, could serve as
an input, rather than an output, of law.205
201

Under Thaler and Sunstein’s capacious definition of a nudge, advice is a nudge.
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6 (“A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of
the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”). As this Article suggests,
it is useful to analyze advice on its own, and it is useful to ask how it might interact with
well-known nudges like setting welfare-enhancing default rules and informing people about
how other people behave.
202
See supra note 187 (discussing the ways that advice can reflect social norms). For
examples of social norms nudges, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 66–70.
203
Recall that advisors appear to be less susceptible to overload and decision fatigue.
See Polman & Vohs, supra note 123, at 475–76. Accordingly, advisors might be less
influenced by default rules. It is possible that the advisor’s degree of effort will land in an
ironic sweet spot: it will be sufficient for them to resist the pull of the default rule, but not
sufficient to make an informed decision. No clear prediction can be made given the state of
the current research. For examples of default rules as nudges, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 110–17, 179–81.
204
For example, a large literature on peer effects examines when and how your choices
are influenced by the choices of others. Conversations that include advice may also include
information about the advisor’s choices and this may interact with the advice given. See, e.g.,
Leonardo Bursztyn, Florian Ederer, Bruno Ferman & Noam Yuchtman, Understanding
Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Financial
Decisions, 82 ECONOMETRICA 1273, 1273 (2014) (finding evidence of learning from others’
choices, and evidence of a desire to “keep up with the Joneses”); see also Daniel A. Effron
& Dale T. Miller, Do as I Say, Not as I’ve Done: Suffering for a Misdeed Reduces the
Hypocrisy of Advising Others Against It, 131 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
16, 16–17 (2015) (finding that people don’t listen to advice from those who don’t practice
what they preach, unless those advisors have suffered for their misdeeds). This is again a
fertile area for further research.
205
Each of the discussions in this Part largely brackets dynamic effects. Consider three
examples. First, advising people to seek advice in situations X and Y might make people less
likely to do so in situation Z, after all the government did not see fit to tell them that advice
would be useful in situation Z. Second, giving incentives to seek advice might create
something like a crowding-out effect, where people stop seeking unincentivised advice.
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A. Advice to Seek Advice
Certain financial products, contracts, or informed consent forms in the medical
context could carry a mandated disclosure that read: “Research suggests that seeking
advice from friends and family about these decisions can be helpful. We encourage
you to seek advice.” Various laws already embrace similar disclosures. While most
of these laws advise people to seek expert advice,206 some also recommend peer
advice. For example, Washington State recommends that people considering a
payday loan first “[t]alk to a friend or family member about borrowing money.”207
Personalizing the timing, phrasing, and format of these messages might
increase the likelihood that someone will actually read them. Adjusting those
features—perhaps especially the way the advice is phrased—could also adjust the
strength of the nudge toward seeking advice. People are likely to react more strongly
to messages that say “Only an idiot would do this without seeking advice first!” than
to a more emotionless promotion of advice.
Advice to seek advice could do some good even if consumers won’t read it. A
disclosure that advises someone to seek advice provides a signal to sophisticated
intermediaries that peer advice might be useful.208 Those intermediates, who
Third, if people embrace advice enthusiastically, they might begin to make many decisions
as part of a group. That is, they might conduct conference calls to decide whether to buy a
house, and when and where to do so. If this occurs, group decision-making dynamics will
come into play and potentially alter the patterns described in Part II. These and other dynamic
effects will be important to study. This Part, however, is intended only as a preliminary
catalog of possibilities. More research would be needed to evaluate the benefits of each
within any given situation.
206
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(E) (requiring people waiving rights under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to be advised to seek an attorney before doing so); United
States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring judges to say something
substantially similar to the following: “I must advise you that in my opinion you would be
far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of
you to try to represent yourself . . . . I would strongly urge you not to try to represent
yourself.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (2020) (stating that prenups are not enforceable unless
the fiancés have been advised to consult an attorney); Voluntary Acknowledgement of
Paternity Form, MASS., http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/cse/parents/voluntary-ack-ofparentage-form.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPE6-PHFR] (“If you have any questions about the
legal consequences of signing the form, consult an attorney before signing.”); MODEL RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A lawyer shall not enter into a
business transaction with a client . . . unless . . . the client is advised in writing of the
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent legal counsel on the transaction . . . .”).
207
Consumers Guide to Payday Loans in Washington State, WASH. DEP’T FIN. INSTS.,
https://dfi.wa.gov/financial-education/information/payday-loans [https://perma.cc/N5TUPCLN] (last visited Nov. 16, 2020). Of course, advice may have been a secondary concern
here. Washington might instead have focused on the possibility that friends or family
members could loan you the money at less cost.
208
For a discussion of the role of intermediaries, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 31, at 190.
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consumers may turn to before they make the relevant decisions, might then reinforce
the usefulness of advice. For example, if such advice were included in mortgage
documents, it might make its way onto Zillow.com. Once there, consumers are far
more likely to read it.
Advice to seek advice also has a self-advertising feature. Suppose one person
in one hundred reads any particular disclosure and pays attention to it. For many
mandated disclosures, this might mean that one person in one hundred will benefit.
But in the case of advice to seek advice, that one person may contact at least one
other person to seek their advice. That act itself becomes a tool to make adviceseeking more common and to strengthen advice-seeking norms.
Regardless of whether consumers learn of the advice to seek advice directly or
indirectly, it can do some good. Most obviously, if they read it, they might seek
advice. And if they do, they will seek out people who have experience with the
relevant product or other relevant knowledge.209 Perhaps surprisingly, even short
discussions with equally inexpert peers can improve decision-making by giving
people more opportunities to process information and evaluate various arguments.210
B. Advice to Simulate Advice: WWJD
Policymakers could harness some of the power of advice simply by asking
people to consider how another person might advise them. Simply asking “What
would your spouse say about this?” or even “What would your best friend do?” alters
the way people think about the decision at hand.211 To take a particularly cute
example, children are better at avoiding tempting distractions and show greater
executive control when they think about what Batman would do,212 or even when

209

MacGeorge et al., supra note 136, at 223.
Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim, Fulya Ersoy & Donna Harris, Peer Advice
on Financial Decisions: A Case of the Blind Leading the Blind? 3 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. W25034, 2018) (“After communicating with a peer, subjects make
private decisions involving both the interest bearing [financial] assets they discussed, as well
as assets they have not previously encountered. We find that peer-communication improves
the quality of subjects’ decisions in both cases . . . .”); id. at 4 (finding that “people in the
bottom half of the financial competence distribution experience greater improvements when
interacting with others in the bottom half than when interacting with others in the top half”).
211
Note, the benefits of simulating advice are not dependent on accurate simulations.
The consumer may wrongly predict what their friend would say. Regardless, simulating
advice changes the way people think about their problems, and this is the benefit that
simulating advice provides. Tal Eyal, Mary Steffel & Nicolas Epley, Perspective Mistaking:
Accurately Understanding the Mind of Another Requires Getting Perspective, Not Taking
Perspective, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 547, 547 (2018) (noting that taking
another’s perspective does not make one an accurate judge of their perspective).
212
Rachel E. White, Emily O. Prager, Catherine Schaefer, Ethan Kross & Angela L.
Duckworth, The “Batman Effect”: Improving Perseverance in Young Children, 88 CHILD
DEV. 1563, 1564 (2017). The effect also works with other characters like Dora, Rapunzel, or
Bob the Builder. Id. at 1566.
210

422

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

they just wear a Superman cape.213 Taking the perspective of another person also
improves reasoning skills by making people more objective,214 more creative
problem solvers,215 and better able to exercise self-control.216 Once you have a
picture in your head of what your spouse might say, or what your best friend would
do, it likely operates as a form of simulated advice. If someone believes that their
best friend would not get the extended service warranty and would advise against it,
they are probably less likely to get it themselves.217 Similar insights may be behind
the “What would Jesus do?”(WWJD) movement and its goal of improving moral
reasoning and self-control.218
Priming people to think about what advice they might receive will also prime
them to feel watched, which in turn increases the salience of social norms.219 As
applied to the choice of whether to see a doctor, asking “What would Jane do?”
would likely amplify the effect of norms like “better safe than sorry.” For example,
people might think that Jane would set aside her embarrassment at her potential
medical condition and work through the annoyance of finding an in-network doctor.
These thoughts could increase the pressure on the potential patient to comply with
relevant norms, which would likely improve decision-making.220
213
Id. Rachel Karnoid, Lior Galili, Dafna Shtilerman, Reut Naim, Karin Stern, Hadar
Manjoch & Rotem Silverman, Why Superman Can Wait: Cognitive Self-Transformation in
the Delay of Gratification Paradigm, 40 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 307, 310
(2011) (finding that children delayed gratification more when wearing the cape).
214
See Ethan Kross & Igor Grossmann, Boosting Wisdom: Distance from the Self
Enhances Wise Reasoning, Attitudes, and Behavior, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 43, 45
(2012).
215
Polman & Emich, supra note 14, at 494–95.
216
White et al., supra note 212, at 1563.
217
Tao Chen, Ajay Karla & Baohong Sun, Why Do Consumers Buy Extended Service
Contracts?, 36 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 611, 611 (2009) (noting the extended warranties are of
little value to consumers, but represent about 50% of Best Buy’s profit); THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 80–82 (using extended warranties as a quintessential example of
a useless product that is only successful because of consumer biases).
218
Karl Smallwood, The Fascinating Story of How the “What Would Jesus Do?”
Slogan Came About, TODAY I FOUND OUT (June 6, 2014), http://www.todayifoundout.com/
index.php/2014/06/origin-jesus-slogan/ [https://perma.cc/RZA4-SAKW].
219
Universities can increase handwashing by approximately 15% just by adding a
cartoon picture of eyes above a sign that, in text, promotes hand washing. Stefan Pfattheicher,
Christoph Strauch, Svenja Diefenbacher & Robert Schnuerch, A Field Study on Watching
Eyes and Hand Hygiene Compliance in a Public Restroom, 48 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 188,
190 (2018). Political parties can increase turnout by about 1% by adding eyes to postcards
that otherwise ask people to vote. Richard E. Matland & Gregg R. Murray, I Only Have Eyes
for You: Does Implicit Social Pressure Increase Voter Turnout?, 37 POL. PSYCH. 533, 533–
36 (2016) (noting mixed results overall for this strategy). More generally, watchful eyes tend
to increase compliance with norms. Ryo Oda, Yuta Kato & Kai Hiraishi, The Watching-Eye
Effect on Prosocial Lying, 13 EVOUTIONARY PSYCH. 1, 1 (2015).
220
Of course, in some social situations, the norms may promote poor decisions. If this
is the case, then asking “What would Jane do?” will likely encourage worse decisions.
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Simulating the act of giving advice will likely have some of the same benefits
as simulating the act of receiving advice. If you want people to get a flu shot, you
might ask them to ask themselves “Should I get a flu shot?” That might help. But
you could also ask them: “Should your friend get the flu shot?” or “What would you
advise your friend to do?”221 As discussed above, being put into the role of advice
giver carries a host of debiasing benefits.222 Once people decide that their friend
should get a flu shot, it will be more likely that they will follow their own advice.223
C. Mandating Opportunities to Seek Advice
Certain financial products could require that consumers have the opportunity to
seek advice before entering the transaction. Some laws already adopt this strategy.224
Other areas of law embrace waiting periods or cooling off periods. Ten states
mandate cooling off periods between payday loans.225 Under these laws, borrowers
who have just gotten out from under one payday loan must wait between 2 and 45
days to obtain another.226 The shorter periods offer a chance to reflect; the longer
periods force potential borrowers to figure out alternate ways of dealing with their
monetary shortfall. Waiting periods and cooling off periods can also facilitate
advice, and this is another reason to support them. For example, pawnshops might
be required to undo the transaction if the customer returns the loaned money within
some time limit. The idea here might be that, once the customer goes home and tells
his spouse about the transaction, that spouse may advise (perhaps strongly) that he
undo it. This is precisely what Washington State does in the context of payday loans.
Borrowers have one day to undo the loan.227 This type of cooling off period can
facilitate reflection and also advice.
221

Frederick Chen & Ryan Stevens, Applying Lessons from Behavioral Economics to
Increase Flu Vaccination Rates, 32 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L 1067, 1070 (2017)
(suggesting that this could increase flu vaccination rates). Other researchers have suggested
that people could improve their understanding of their own personality traits if they judged
them while taking another’s perspective. Vazire & Carlson, supra note 55, at 107.
222
See supra Part II.A.
223
In this way, advice-giving may benefit both the advisee and the advisor.
224
Many states consider when the prenup was presented to determine whether to
enforce it. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 352 (N.H. 2003). This is relevant
in part because courts want fiancés to have the opportunity to seek independent advice. Id.
225
Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.
54,472, 54,478 (Nov. 17, 2017).
226
Virginia has a 45 day cooling off period after an extended time of indebtedness. Id.
at 54,485. Virginia also requires a 1 day cooling off period before getting a subsequent pay
day loan. Supplemental Findings on Payday, Payday Installment, and Vehicle Title Loans,
and Deposit Advance Products, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0025 (June 16, 2016). Illinois
requires cooling off periods between payday loans of at least 7 days, depending on the
circumstances. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5 (2020).
227
Payday Lending–—Borrower Rights and Responsibilities, WASH. DEPT. OF FIN.
INST. (Dec. 28, 2009) https://dfi.wa.gov/documents/consumer/payday-brochure.pdf
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Even micro-waiting periods have the potential to assist borrowers. For
example, payday loans might be required to insert a five-minute wait before
beginning the paperwork, during which they must disclose that the relevant
government entity recommends that they call a friend and seek advice. This microwaiting period could have two effects. First, it creates a pause that makes it more
likely that consumers will read or hear a relevant disclosure and actually think about
it for a moment. Second, because seeking advice could be as easy and quick as a
phone call or text, even a short pause could create sufficient space.
These micro-waiting periods would be particularly easy to implement in the
increasingly common online sector of the small loan industry. Online lending
emerged in the 2000s and is the “fastest growing component” of the small-dollar
subprime market.228 While physical store revenue has been declining, online revenue
has been increasing, with $11 billion in loan volume as of 2012.229 In the process of
applying online, it would be easy to mandate and monitor compliance with a microwaiting period. The relevant sites could be required to show a screen with the
standardized warnings along with advice to seek advice. That screen could also have
a countdown to move on with the transaction, much like you can skip ads on
YouTube, but only after a certain amount of time has passed.
The emerging market for app-based loans provides additional opportunities to
implement creative micro-waiting periods. App-based loans provide unique
opportunities because those apps could be integrated with other apps on a
smartphone. The micro-waiting period could specifically recommend, or even open
by default, a messaging or texting app. One might even imagine Facebook
integrations where the app predicts the identity of your closest friend and suggests
that you message them.
In some cases, firms might have sufficient control over the transaction that they
can effectively minimize the opportunity or prevent the consumer from seeking
advice.230 In these circumstances, incentivizing or mandating advice might be more
productive.

[https://perma.cc/WPG6-9P67]; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167E, § 7(d)(2) (2020)
(“[A]n applicant for the [reverse mortgage] loan shall not be bound for 7 days after his
acceptance, in writing, of the lender’s written commitment to make the loan.”).
228
NUÑEZ ET AL., supra note 132, at 4.
229
Id. Lenders may have shifted to online loans in part to avoid potential regulation of
traditional payday loans.
230
See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1174 (2013); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1638 (2014) (“Mandating new forms of disclosure is
unlikely to significantly improve outcomes when . . . firms have strong incentives to
undermine choice in response to the required disclosures.”); Jacob Hale Russell, The
Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft
Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 36 (2015) (noting that proponents of “nudges
rarely consider the ability of third parties to counter-nudge or to weaken nudge outcomes”).
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D. Incentivizing Advice
Just as governments use tax breaks, subsidies, and various penalties to shape
behavior, they could also create incentives to promote advice-seeking.231 In the
financial context, one could imagine a required nominal charge on payday loans that
is waived if you make a phone call while you wait. Some people may just pretend
to call someone to ask about advice. So be it. But others might actually do so. A
much stronger regulation might allow fee waivers only if the advisor signed the
relevant loan contract.232 Regardless, the nominal fee provides the borrower with an
incentive to seek advice. Larger loans, like mortgages, might justify larger incentives
and more stringent requirements for waiving the relevant fee.233
Similar incentives might work in the medical and educational contexts as well.
If potential law students are overly optimistic about their future 1L performance and
employment prospects, then incentivizing them to seek advice from current students
or alum might be helpful. Elective medical procedures like Lasik, teeth whitening,
and cosmetic surgery could include fees that are waived if you seek advice. This
could help people better understand the everyday hedonic impact (or lack thereof)
of those procedures.234
Incentivizing advice could be particularly useful for people who associate a
stigma with advice-seeking. Some people want to ask for advice, but may fear that
231

Those incentives could be framed as avoiding losses or realizing gains. Because
lenders might have the capacity to reframe any proposed governmental frame, this section
will not make much of the potential differences between these frames.
232
One could imagine that consumers would get annoyed every time they take out this
payday loan, because they are never able to get someone else to sign it or to answer their
phone at the particular time that they were seeking the loan. But that annoyance might make
the government message—you should seek advice—all the more memorable even if it’s not
always achievable in practice.
233
Incentives could also influence the lender’s behavior. States that regulate lending
could loosen those regulations if the lender promotes advice-seeking. For example, a city
that requires a “Predatory Lender” warning sign might waive that requirement if the lender
has certain procedures that promote advice-seeking. Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning:
Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 893, 893 (2012) (proposing a similar warning). Alternatively, lenders might
be subject to different usury laws depending on their general advice-promoting policies or
whether an advice-giver signed off on a particular loan. Of course, these could be
personalized to apply differently to different lenders, different consumers, or different
combinations of lender and consumer.
234
Claire E. Ashton-James & Axel Chemke-Dreyfus, Can Orthognathic Surgery Be
Expected to Improve Patients’ Psychological Well-Being? The Challenge of Hedonic
Adaptation, 127 EUR. J. ORAL SCI. 189, 190 (2019) (“[S]ystematic reviews conclude that the
effects of elective cosmetic surgery are not enduring.”); Kaoru Tounaka-Fujii, Kenya Yuki,
Kazuno Negishi, Ikuko Toda, Takayuki Abe, Keisuke Kouyama & Kazuo Tsubota, Effects
of Laser in Situ Keratomileusis on Mental Health-Related Quality of Life, 10 CLINICAL
OPHTHALMOLOGY 1859, 1862 (2016) (“Surprisingly, no significant improvement was
observed in [health-related quality of life] after 6 months of LASIK.”).
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there is some stigma attached to doing so.235 Monetary incentives might help these
people save face. They might be able to say “I’m getting $10 for asking you this!”
and this might help them avoid embarrassment and make them feel like savvy
consumers. Stronger incentives could potentially overcome stronger resistance to
advice-seeking. Even someone whose self-concept is rooted in their independence
may seek advice if doing so produces a significant benefit.
E. Mandating Advice
Although some welfarist policymakers might wish to mandate advice, there are
several problems with such a proposal. Expert medical and legal advice leaves a
paper trail. Peer advice does not.236 Without an official means to record peer advice,
mandating advice would be difficult. Perhaps all policymakers could really mandate
is that people attest to the fact that advice was sought or received.237 This is not
completely toothless because people don’t like lying.238 But there are reasons to
question whether mandating advice will work.
Mandating advice also comes with increased paternalism and privacy concerns.
Requiring advice is significantly more paternalistic than merely requiring a microwaiting period. It interferes not just in people’s financial lives, but also their personal
lives and self-concept. People may value the idea that they don’t have to rely on
others. People may want to insulate their friends from worry, or to keep their
situation a secret from others for more selfish reasons. This would be difficult to do
if you had to seek advice about a reverse mortgage or a potential prostate cancer
treatment.
These concerns are weighty, but not necessarily insurmountable.239 The law
does mandate advice, at least in some circumstances. Massachusetts requires
mortgage counseling for those seeking to enter a reverse mortgage.240 Some states
require criminal defendants to have the advice of counsel before they plead guilty to
a capital offense.241 In some states, you cannot waive alimony in a prenup unless

235

Daena J. Goldsmith, Soliciting Advice: The Role of Sequential Placement in
Mitigating Face Threat, 67 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 1, 5 (2000).
236
Of course, it would be possible to design a set of forms or other mechanisms to
verify that peer advice was sought, given, or both.
237
One could also mandate that the advice-giver sign the relevant contract or provide
other documentation.
238
Rachel Barkan, Shahar Ayal & Dan Ariely, Ethical Dissonance, Justifications, and
Moral Behavior, 6 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 157, 157 (2015) (describing the phenomenon of
ethical dissonance).
239
Robertson, supra note 5, at 690 (discussing mandatory second opinions, and finding
evidence that they work).
240
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167E, § 7(e) (2020) (“A bank shall not make a reverse
mortgage [until] the prospective borrower has completed a reverse mortgage counseling
program.”).
241
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (2020).
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you were represented by counsel.242 You cannot reaffirm debt that was discharged
in bankruptcy without the approval of your attorney.243 Although none of these laws
implicate advice from friends or family, they nonetheless highlight the possibility
that, in at least some situations, policymakers might overcome barriers to mandating
advice.
F. Promoting Conditions that Facilitate Advice
Various laws could create circumstances or background conditions that make
spontaneous advice-seeking more likely. Here, the positive potential of advice could
be an additional reason to support a set of reforms that, on their face, have little to
do with advice.
Ethan Leib has argued that the law should do more to support friendships.
Because friends are a probable source of valuable advice, promoting friendships
might also promote advice. He offers numerous ways for the law to foster stronger
norms of friendships:244
We could offer tax breaks or deductions for “friendship expenditures”; we
could allow “loss of society” damages to friends of those who die from
tortious conduct; we could establish a “Friends Medical Leave Act” to
allow friends to leave work to take care of one another during sickness;
we could allow friends to sue on one another’s behalf and furnish them
with standing; we could give prisoners rights to see their friends (as we
do); we could presume to give friends the legal right to make medical
decisions on our behalf (without a contract giving them that right); and we
could establish legal rituals to solidify friendships just as we solemnize the
status of marriage and citizenship—our other associative duties—through
public oaths and legal documents.245
Some of his suggestions are more closely aligned with advice-seeking than others.
For example, he argues that friends should have fiduciary duties toward one another,
perhaps including a duty to keep certain information private.246 This might provide
a safer space for people to open up about their financial missteps and medical
conditions.247
242

See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (2020).
11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(5)(A).
244
Leib, supra note 196, at 692 (discussing the effects of fiduciary duties on extralegal
norms).
245
Id. at 682–83 (footnotes omitted).
246
Id. at 692–94.
247
See also Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity
Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 186 (2013) (recommending privacy laws and
confidentiality rules as one way to reduce stigma rooted in the revealing one’s BMI and other
medical facts surrounding obesity); Jennifer A. Neuhauser, Lives of Quiet Desperation: The
243
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Reducing the stigma and social discomfort about monetary discussions could
also help promote financial advice-seeking. Many advocates have proposed
mandatory disclosure of private salaries as a way to discourage and identify gender
discrimination.248 Doing so might affect the social norms surrounding salary privacy.
Although salaries are only one part of a much larger set of money-related topics,
they strongly implicate the associations between money and self-worth. To the
extent that salary disclosure laws reduce the stigma of discussing salary, they might
at least partially help to reduce the stigma of talking about money more generally.
This in turn, could reduce the barriers to seeking advice on financial matters.
Understanding this potential link between salary privacy and advice-seeking
provides another potential reason to support salary disclosure regimes.
G. Advice as Input
In the sections above, advice was the output that the policymaker sought to
produce. This section shifts focus. It asks whether courts should take notice of advice
as an input into determinations like undue influence or unconscionability, and
whether legal directives might be sensitive to whether people have or could have
received advice.
The law already recognizes that advice, or access to it, matters. Sometimes, the
law only recognizes the impact of expert advice. For example, some states mandate
that fiancés have a meaningful opportunity to seek counsel before signing a
prenup.249 Other states preclude certain contract terms if the parties were not
represented by counsel.250 The law also recognizes the power of non-expert advice,
in at least a few places. Consider the doctrine of undue influence, which creates an
affirmative defense to the enforceability of instruments that are grounded in consent,
like contracts, deeds, and gifts.251 This doctrine recognizes the power of non-expert
advice in at least two ways.

Conflict Between Military Necessity and Confidentiality, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1003, 1037
(2011) (“Encouraging soldiers to seek help for psychological issues means the military must
protect therapist-patient confidentiality as rigorously as that between a chaplain and a soldier
or an attorney and a client.”).
248
Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage
Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 385, 427 (2013); Sarah Lyons, Why the Law Should Intervene to Disrupt PaySecrecy Norms: Analyzing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Through the Lens of Social
Norms, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 361, 390–91 (2013); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg,
Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 951, 1020 (2011).
249
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–36g (a)(4) (2020).
250
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (2020).
251
Undue Influence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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First, courts will look to whether the victim was isolated from friends and
family.252 This is part of a larger inquiry into whether one party was under the
domination of the other.253 Victims who are isolated are more susceptible to the
subtle forms of coercion that undue influence seeks to police.254 Victims who still
maintain relationships with others, and can discuss the relevant contract or deed with
those other people, are less likely to be susceptible to undue influence.255 In a case
that sought to set aside gifts to a cult, the First Circuit differentiated between two
different gifts.256 The court refused to set aside a $1 million gift in part because the
donor had sought advice from her husband before making it.257 In contrast, the same
court set aside a $5 million gift in part because the church leader encouraged the
victim to keep it a secret from her husband.258
Second, even if there is a clear element of domination in the relationship
between the parties, some types of advice can negate an undue influence claim. Most
of the relevant caselaw discusses advice from an independent attorney. So, for
example, a presumption of undue influence might arise based on the dominant
position that one person held over another, but receiving independent legal advice
can “remove[] the cloud of undue influence.”259 Although most cases deal with legal
advice, they do not require that the advice comes from an attorney. Courts have held
that independent advice from family members like sisters and mothers can remove
the cloud of undue influence at least under some circumstances.260
252

See, e.g., Mueller v. Wells, 367 P.3d 580, 585 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (discussing
efforts to isolate victim from family and friends as relevant to whether presumption of undue
influence arose).
253
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.70(a) (2020).
254
Mary Joy Quinn, Undoing Undue Influence, 24 GENERATIONS 65, 65 (2000) (noting
that undue influence usually begins by isolating the victim from their family and friends); C.
Peisah, S. Finkel, K. Shulman, P. Melding, J. Luxenberg, J. Heinik, R. Jacoby, B. Reisberg,
G. Stoppe, A. Barker, H. Firmino & H. Bennett, The Wills of Older People: Risk Factors for
Undue Influence, 21 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 7, 10 (2009) (noting that isolation is what
allows subtle distortions in the truth to take hold).
255
In re Love, 182 B.R. 161, 174 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995) (“The final factor this Court
will consider is an attempt by the spiritual leader to isolate the follower from his or her friends
and family. . . . This factor additionally weighs heavily in support of a finding of undue
influence, as the concern and advice of Plaintiff’s family and friends would have helped to
somewhat diffuse the dominance and control Defendant exercised over Plaintiff.” (emphasis
added)).
256
In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 642–45 (1st Cir. 1989).
257
Id. at 643.
258
Id. at 643–44.
259
Gaeth v. Newman, 199 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Neb. 1972).
260
Weil v. Weil, 236 P.2d 159, 169–70 (Cal. 1951) (overcoming a presumption of
undue influence when signatory’s sister advised her and was with her when she signed the
deed); see also Barham v. Cooper, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00200, 1997 WL 542922, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997) (finding that advice from mother was not relevant because
she had a conflict of interest); but see Giacobbi v. Anselmi, 87 A.2d 748, 756–57 (N.J. Super.
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Other areas of law could also consider the impact of advice. The
unconscionability doctrine generally requires an “absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.”261 The inquiry into “meaningful choice” could
productively include an inquiry into advice. Sometimes people who received advice
about the contract will have a greater degree of choice. Recall that advisors generally
come up with more creative alternatives and advice generally points people in
positive directions. Of course, the particular facts drive decisions on
unconscionability, and advice will not necessarily defeat an unconscionability claim.
But the welfare-enhancing nature of peer advice suggests that courts should add
advice to the list of potential important factors to consider in unconscionability
claims. Similarly, courts could more explicitly consider advice when determining
whether people entered prenuptial and postnuptial agreements voluntarily.262 Advice
is also relevant to whether differentials in bargaining power existed, which tends to
heighten the burden faced by the person attempting to enforce the prenup or
postnup.263
The above examples show how advice might be relevant as an input into an ex
post determination made by a court. It could also be relevant, at least in a rough way,
to ex ante regulation. For decisions where the probability of receiving advice is
low—perhaps this is true for intensely personal decisions or those relating to
stigmatized actions—the law could require greater consumer protections. These
could include longer cooling off periods, longer waiting periods, restrictions on
particular contract terms, etc. For decisions where advice-seeking is more common,
lesser protections might be sufficient. The next Part will discuss more-nuanced ways
to incorporate advice into ex ante regulations. It does so by discussing the futuristic
potential for personalizing law.
IV. HYBRID ADVICE: COMBINING PEER ADVICE AND AI ADVICE
A growing literature explores the impact of big data and AI for legal regulation.
This Part highlights one facet of this body of scholarship: the possibility that AI will
Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (rejecting the idea that a realtor’s advice was sufficient in part because he
was not a lawyer).
261
8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed. 2020).
262
See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 759 S.E.2d 468, 472 (W. Va. 2014) (“The validity of a
prenuptial agreement is dependent upon its valid procurement, which requires its having been
executed voluntarily, with knowledge of its content and legal effect, under circumstances
free of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation; however, although advice of independent counsel
at the time parties enter into a prenuptial agreement helps demonstrate that there has been no
fraud, duress or misrepresentation, and that the agreement was entered into knowledgeably
and voluntarily, such independent advice of counsel is not a prerequisite to
enforceability . . . .”).
263
See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 353 (N.H. 2003) (“Prenuptial
agreements that result from such a vast disparity in bargaining power must meet a high
standard of procedural fairness.”).
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become sophisticated enough to provide accurate personalized advice. Even in a
world where this “AI advice” is a reality, peer advice maintains several
advantages.264 Accordingly, this Part illustrates several hybrid approaches that take
advantage of the unique benefits of both AI advice and peer advice.
A. Imagining Personalized Law and AI Advice
Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of legal scholarship exploring
the possibility of personalized law.265 This literature generally takes an optimistic
view of technological progress and envisions a world in which AI sorts through
massive amounts of data about each and every person to generate legal directives
that are personalized for each person and every situation.266 This marriage of big
data and AI is a potent combination. Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett coined
the term “micro-directive” to describe the potential ability of a future AI to generate
different rules for different people, all in real time.267 For example, everyone’s nowalways-connected car might receive speed limits that apply only to the particular
driver at the particular time.268 That speed limit could change if the weather changes,
or if the AI detects erratic driving, or even if the AI learns that you forgot to drink
coffee that morning.269 Mandatory disclosures could also be personalized in useful
ways. For example, warnings could be tailored to each person’s literacy and
numeracy, and medical disclosures could highlight the side effects that are relevant

264

See generally Williams, supra note 20.
Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2013)
(“[P]ersonalized default rules are the wave of the future . . . .”); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV.
1417, 1418–19 (2014) (personalized default rules and disclosures); Omri Ben-Shahar &
Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 628, 636–46 (2016)
(negligence standards); Casey & Niblett, supra note 19, at 1412 (speed limits and medical
malpractice rules); Philipp Hacker, Personalizing EU Private Law: From Disclosures to
Nudges and Mandates, 25 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 651, 669 (2017) (disclosures); Omri BenShahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in Contract Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
255, 255 (2019) (mandatory contract rules); Busch, supra note 19, at 309–13 (disclosures
and privacy defaults); Adi Libson & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the Personalization of
Copyright Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 528 (2019) (copyright penalties); Anthony J. Casey
& Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
333, 338, 347 (2019) (smart traffic lights); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Assessing the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
489, 490–91 (2019) (Miranda warnings); see also Andrew Verstein, Privatizing
Personalized Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 558 (2019) (“[T]rends in data gathering and
analysis suggest that well-resourced lawmakers may soon have the technical ability to link
directives to highly particular individual traits.”).
266
See supra note 19.
267
Casey & Niblett, supra note 19, at 1404.
268
See id.
269
See id.
265
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to specific patients.270 People with certain personality traits might be assigned
different mandatory contract terms to reflect their differential susceptibility to
aggressive sales tactics.271 Nudges and default rules could also be personalized. In
an only-partially-tongue-and-cheek example, Ariel Porat and Lior Strahilevitz
suggest that if AI combs through data and finds that most heterosexual vegan men
with Ph.D.s in philosophy take their wife’s last name, then this could be the default
legal regime that governs those people.272
This future may be closer than we think. AI can detect skin cancers as well as
dermatologists.273 AI can predict divorce as well as trained therapists, and the AI can
do it based solely on subtle inflections of the spouses’ voices.274 In many other areas
AI can do things humans never dreamed possible. AI can tell your sex and age just
by analyzing the electrical patterns in your heart.275 A Google AI can look at just
your retina and determine your sex, whether you smoke, and your risk of a heart
attack.276 AI can already beat the best human masters in the world at games like
chess, Go, and Jeopardy.277 Given this impressive list of accomplishments, it is not
unreasonable to predict that AI will one day be a powerful tool for policymakers to
tap into.
In a companion piece, I explored personalized advice as a novel addition to the
landscape of personalized law.278 An AI may know better than you the probability
that you will miss a credit card payment. Accordingly, it might advise against credit
cards with high late payment penalties. Scraping cell phone and social media data
will allow that AI to predict even your basic personality traits,279 which themselves
270

See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 265, at 1444–45.
See id. at 1471.
272
Id. at 1465.
273
Andre Esteva, Brett Kuprel, Roberto A. Novoa, Justin Ko, Susan M. Swetter, Helen
M. Blau & Sebastian Thrun, Dermatologist-Level Classification of Skin Cancer with Deep
Neural Networks, 542 NATURE 115, 115 (2017).
274
Md Nasir, Brian Robert Baucom, Panayiotis Georgious & Shrikanth Narayanan,
Predicting Couple Therapy Outcomes Based on Speech Acoustic Features, 12 PLOS ONE
e0185123, 1, 17 (2017).
275
Zachi I. Attia, Paul A. Friedman, Peter A. Noseworthy, Francisco Lopez-Jimenez,
Dorothy J. Ladewig, Gaurav Satam, Patricia A. Pellikka, Thomas M. Munger, Samuel J.
Asirvatham, Christopher G. Scott, Ricket E. Carter & Suraj Kapa, Age and Sex Estimation
Using Artificial Intelligence from Standard 12-Lead ECGs, 12 CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA
& ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 1, 1 (2019).
276
Anthony Lydgate, To an AI, Every Eye Tells a Story, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/wired25-sundar-pichai-r-kim-artificial-intelligence-vision/
[https://perma.cc/U2R2-48XV].
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Casey & Niblett, supra note 19, at 1424.
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See generally Williams, supra note 20.
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Gokul Chittaranjan, Jan Bloom & Daniel Gatica-Perez, Mining Large-Scale
Smartphone Data for Personality Studies, 17 PERS. & UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2011)
(prepublication manuscript); see also Jacopo Staiano, Fabio Pianesi, Bruno Lepri, Nicu Sebe,
Nadav Aharony & Alex Pentland, Friends Don’t Lie: Inferring Personality Traits from
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correlate with a number of outcomes that we have trouble predicting for ourselves.
Taking an optimistic view of technological progress, AI will someday generate more
accurate advice than even one’s friends and family could. I called this AI advice,
and argued that AI advice has significant advantages over disclosures or default
rules.280
This Part maintains the optimistic view on technological progress that is
common in the literature on personalized law. The reader may then wonder: What
good is peer advice if, as assumed, accurate personalized AI advice is available? The
next section answers that question.
B. Enduring Benefits of Peer Advice
Even in a future of accurate, personalized, AI advice, peer advice is a resource
that policymakers should tap into. Sometimes the identity of the messenger yields
important benefits that an AI may not be able to capture. Further, peer advice avoids
concerns about overly-centralized influence and governmental influence.
The messenger matters. The allure of AI advice is that it will have exceedingly
accurate content. The advice will recommend the right path.281 But regardless of the
accuracy of its content, advice can be packaged in ways that make people more or
less likely to heed it. Peer advice has an advantage here. People are more likely to
listen to advice or credit factual assertions when they trust the speaker.282 For high
stake decisions, trust is more a function of emotional connection, and less about
expertise.283 Even holding trust constant, emotional connections allow others to
influence us. Friends and family can influence us in ways that strangers cannot,
regardless of how much we believe the stranger is an expert in whatever field is most
relevant to the decision at hand. I may ignore a trusted expert who insists that I put
more money into my retirement account, but I may not feel as free to ignore my
spouse or parents when they make similar demands. Until we develop emotional
attachments to AI, such that we feel bad for disappointing it and want to make it
Social Network Structure, Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Ubiquitous
Computing—UbiComp (Sept. 5–8, 2013), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/9
2394/Pentland_Friends%20don%27t.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/9GK
V-RXUB] (internal citation omitted).
280
See generally Williams, supra note 20.
281
Of course, this assumes some consensus about which decisions are better. See supra
note 187 and accompanying text. An AI could be limited to offering advice only in areas
where we have such a consensus. See John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson &
Brigitte C. Madrian, How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787, 1793 (2008)
(“Governments could play a constructive advisory role if (1) their advice is only given in
circumstances when the many different measures of normative preferences discussed above
tend to coincide, and (2) their advice is offered without any obligation to obey . . . .”).
282
Van Swol et al., supra note 136, at 28.
283
See Mellina da Silva Terres, Cristiane Pizzutti dos Santos & Kenny Basso,
Antecedents of the Client’s Trust in Low Versus High-Consequence Decisions, 29 J. SERVS.
MKTG. 26, 34 (2015).
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proud, it will not be able to fully capture the packaging benefits of peer advice.
Further, the emotional supports that friends and family provide may not translate
well into the context of AI advice. Friends commonly add encouragements and
affirmations to advice to make it more palatable. A friend who says “You can do it!”
is showing their support. If an AI said this, it might feel empty or condescending. A
friend might point out all the good things you do for others in order to bolster your
self-esteem, enhance your self-control, and reduce your potential defensiveness.284
A friend who notices all of those things you did is attentive and caring. An AI that
notices them is creepy and invasive.285 We want to “be seen” by our friends but
perhaps not by an AI.
This leads to a tradeoff. To simplify greatly, one might have to choose between
incredibly accurate advice that only some people will listen to and decent (but not
optimal) advice that most people will listen to. There is no way to make this choice
in the abstract. But there are two preliminary reasons to consider peer advice rather
than relying solely on AI advice. First, peer advice is decentralized. Second, peer
advice is generated without government influence.
Centralized influence is potentially dangerous. If one AI or one set of
algorithms determines the advice that people receive, then sophisticated parties
might attempt to influence that advice. These concerns exist both in and outside of
the government context. In the corporate context, we might fear that Amazon or
Google might steer people to its own products rather than the products of its rivals.
In the government context, we might fear something akin to agency capture.
Sophisticated interests might try to influence the advice that the AI generates either
by altering some of its basic programming or influencing the inputs that it uses to
generate advice.
Decentralized advice largely avoids these dangers. If Google or Amazon want
to influence peer advice about their products—namely, word of mouth endorsements
or recommendations286—they cannot just tweak their own recommendation
algorithms. They would have to convince massive numbers of consumers to spread
a particular recommendation to their friends and family. This is not easy. It is also
not necessarily objectionable. If Amazon convinces people to sing the praises of
their Fire Tablet, it most likely does so by making people who own those tablets
very happy. That is, by creating a good product that gets people excited. This is a
good thing. Decentralized advice, therefore, makes manipulation harder and
channels attempted influence into productive pursuits.287
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Regardless of whether advice is more or less centralized, some may object to
governmental attempts to influence choice. For example, they may object to policies
that interfere with the market regardless of whether they are pursued by cities, states,
or the federal government. This objection does not apply to peer advice. No
government body can control the content or packaging of peer advice. Of course,
the government can try to influence peer advice. Local governments may conduct
information campaigns encouraging childhood vaccination. But influencing public
opinion is tricky. Again, the decentralized aspects of peer advice make it difficult
for any entity to control the content.
The discussion above suggests that peer advice maintains some advantages
over AI advice. This Part now turns to how AI advice and peer advice could
productively coexist.
C. Two Simple Integrations
1. Either/Or
At the most basic level, an AI could determine when to rely on AI advice, and
when to facilitate peer advice. Some people may be particularly unlikely to follow
AI advice, or particularly in need of the unique emotional support that peer advice
can offer. Similarly, in some situations social support may be more important than
accuracy. These dispositional and situational factors interact in complex ways. But
an AI sophisticated enough to offer accurate personalized advice may also be
sophisticated enough to predict when natural advisors might have more impact. One
could imagine the AI running countless experiments and testing which retirementsavings-oriented interventions lead people to save most. It might learn that, for some
subset of the population,288 advising people to seek advice from a friend works better
than providing specific personalized advice, and perhaps even works better than the
combination of the two. Of course, more customizations are possible. The AI may
mine your email, Facebook profile, and location data and conclude that you have no
close friends. If so, advice to seek advice may not be helpful. In contrast, if the AI
predicts that you have numerous friends who have experience with the relevant
decision, advice to seek advice is likely to be quite useful.
2. Further Personalization
In addition to broadly deciding when to use peer advice and when to use AI
advice, an AI could customize each of the various ways of promoting peer advice.
For example, asking “What would your spouse say about this?” is not useful if you
288
For research attempting to identify subgoups more or less likely to take advice, see
Byrne et al., supra note 176, at 409 (finding that social ostracism makes people devalue
advice from others, but overvalue objective computer generated advice); see See et al., supra
note 176, at 272 (finding “a negative relationship between power and advice taking” caused
by power’s effect on increasing one’s confidence); Kausel et al., supra note 176, at 33
(finding that narcissism reduces advice-taking).
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are not married, but could be very useful if you are. Asking “What would your
friends recommend?” may produce different results depending on who your friends
are. Sometimes it might be better to ask “What advice would you give your friends,
if they were faced with this decision?” A sophisticated AI may someday be able to
predict which types of interventions lead to better decisions.
An AI could also personalize who receives incentives to seek advice and what
those incentives are. For some people, paying a no-advice penalty may be
motivating; for others, an advice-bonus might work better.289 For still others, nonmonetary incentives might work best.290 For example, Jim might be offered a coupon
for a beer at his favorite bar if he seeks advice. This might be especially motivating
for Jim, and it might also indirectly harness some power of social connections. When
Jim redeems his coupon, he may well tell people that he got it by asking for advice.
Here, again, we see the possibility to design systems that are likely to be selfadvertising.
Personalizing mandates is also promising because it reduces the strength of
various objections to them. Mandating opportunities to seek advice imposes small
delay costs. Mandating advice itself imposes large privacy costs. Personalization
could greatly reduce the number of people subjected to these mandates. The more
that these mandates are used only for people and situations where less invasive
regulations either have failed or would fail, the more likely that they offer a
defensible balance of welfare and autonomy.
Finally, personalization can affect when advice is used as an input to law. When
judges take access to advice into account in undue influence claims, they do so in
the context of an ex post trial with discovery and witnesses. This allows judges to
make an informed judgment about the nature and degree of advice that a person
received. Personalization offers the potential to apply these nuanced judgments to
ex ante regulation. These personalizations could, for example, apply to a common
feature of consumer finance law: cooling off periods.291 In their non-personalized
form, all people might have to wait ten days before obtaining a second payday loan,
or they might have three days to cancel a contract formed during an encounter with
a door-to-door salesman.292 In their personalized form, each person might have
different cooling off periods for different products, and those might even change
depending on the other features of the decision environment. For example, cooling
off periods might be longer for people with smaller or less tight-knit social networks.
One could even imagine different rules depending on whether you have sought
289
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advice that big data could capture and verify. People who solicited advice on
Facebook about payday loans, for example, might have shorter cooling off periods.
Payday lenders could then offer those people cash more quickly or at a reduced rate
to account for the lesser burden they face when loaning to those customers.
D. Two Complex Integrations
In addition to the integrations described above, there are many more nuanced
combinations. For the sake of illustration, this section will discuss two of the nearinfinite possibilities. First, an AI could influence the content of peer advice by
steering you to particular advisors. Second, an AI could try to launder its content by
speaking through a peer advisor.
1. Peer Advice from AI-Selected Advisors
For several of the strategies outlined in the last Part, it would be theoretically
possible to select a particular person to act as an advisor. Instead of generically
advising you to seek advice from “friends or family”293 an AI might advise you to
seek advice from “your friend Jane.” Similarly, an AI might advise you to simulate
advice from a particular person, provide incentives to seek advice from particular
people, or mandate that you receive advice from particular people. For example, an
AI might select advisors with particular experience. Alternatively, an AI might
mandate that you seek advice from people with similar personality traits and
preferences to you. An AI could strategically select the source of simulated advice
as well. We might predict that asking people, “What would Satan do?” might lead
them down a different path than asking them, “What would Jesus do?” Similarly,
asking them, “What would Jane do?” might lead them to different results than asking
them, “What would Stan do?” If Jane is especially conscientious and risk averse,
then asking people to simulate her advice will probably result in more conscientious
and less risky choices. If Stan has a higher risk tolerance, then asking what he would
do might lead people toward riskier choices.
These strategic selections create two main concerns. First, this practice might
create externalities by burdening certain people. Just because Jane gives good advice
does not necessarily mean we should be asking her to field 100 texts a day asking
for that advice. Second, privacy concerns emerge. Jane may not want the AI advising
others to “Ask Jane, because she lost her house by accidentally signing an adjustable
rate mortgage.” Even if the AI does not provide this reason or explanation of why it
selected Jane, people might eventually pick up on the AI’s pattern of advising people

293

This is already a form of strategic selection because it points you to a set of people
who are likely to want to give good advice. But the possibility of strategic selection only
really blossoms with an AI that knows enough about your friends, family, and other contacts
that it can further customize the advisor.
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to seek advice from people with relevant experience. So just saying “Ask Stan” in
the context of vasectomies might tip people off that Stan got one recently.294
These privacy concerns do not apply to all contexts. Implying that someone got
a vasectomy may be far more invasive than implying that they spent a lot of time
thinking about how to diversify their retirement funds. Similarly, implying that Stan
is great at understanding probability and risk is hardly an offensive invasion of his
privacy. Policymakers or the AI itself can distinguish between instances where
privacy concerns are relatively high and those where privacy concerns are lower.
Further, neither privacy nor externality concerns apply as strongly to simulated
advice. Suppose an AI asks you to “Imagine what Jane would say about this.” It is
unlikely that this would reveal any private information about Jane. It would be hard
to infer that Jane was selected because she had some particular experience in the
past. If the advisee does not know that Jane had the relevant experience, it will not
affect the simulated advice, and hence would be irrelevant to the AI’s choice.295
Selecting Jane as the subject of simulated advice is also less likely to burden Jane.
Of course, it is possible that people will follow-up their imagined advice with an
actual phone call to Jane to seek her actual advice. But given how much even small
transaction costs affect behavior, this seems unlikely. It is also possible that people
will come to resent Jane, like they might resent a teacher’s pet. But again, this seems
speculative.
Regardless, both privacy concerns and externalities can be mitigated by giving
people some measure of control over how the AI operates. Some people may not
want others to know that they lost their house by signing a mortgage agreement with
hidden terms, but others might want the chance to save others from that fate.
Accordingly, there could be some system for people to set customized limits around
the AI’s use of them as advisors. Personalization can also mitigate externalities, and
in the same way. We could allow people to add or remove themselves from the list
of persons that the AI could recommend as an advisor, or set other customized limits.
2. AI-Influenced Peer Advice
The previous subsections addressed the demand side for advice. AI advice
could also seek to alter supply. Imagine an AI issuing you some piece of AI advice
294
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and simultaneously informing a friend or family member that you have received this
advice. This might trigger two effects. First, the friend or family member might think
that the advice is sound. Second, they might call you to tell you that. An example
may help. An AI provides you with personalized advice to contribute the maximum
amount to your retirement account, or to get a flu shot, or to avoid adjustable rate
mortgages. It also notifies your mother that it gave you this advice. What might your
mom do? She might call you to make sure you follow the advice. Of course, she
might disagree with the advice. This is not necessarily bad. It presents a check on
centralized government influence. Regardless, it stimulates thought and discussion
about the issue, which themselves can lead to better decision-making.
Looking at the above example from a different angle, the AI could launder its
advice. That is, the AI could send messages that try to convince your mother to give
you advice that matches what the AI would have recommended. The ultimate goal
would be to have the AI’s advice content get delivered through her. Here, unlike the
discussion above, the AI is not only trying to trigger advice, but also trying to
exercise direct influence over its content. The first target of behavioral change is
your mother. The AI would test various ways of convincing her that it is offering
good advice, and convincing her to pass along that advice to you. The second target
would be you, responding to the advice she provided.
Of course, these hybrid systems lead to several objections. Privacy and
externality concerns are particularly powerful. It may be hard to justify both
revealing personal information about you to your friends and inducing them to worry
about you just to improve your ultimate decision. But an opt-in regime might be
defensible. People could sign up to participate in this type of system, as the advisee,
advisor, or both. It’s not hard to believe that at least some people would opt in. Some
spouses share their real-time cell phone location information with one another,
others don’t. Some spouses share all of their passwords, others don’t. People who
might want more advice, but know that they will often fail to seek it because of time
constraints or embarrassment, might well precommit to the laundered advice
described in this subsection, at least in some decision domains.
E. Summary
Comparing AI advice to everyday peer advice reveals new advantages of the
latter. Not only is advice-giving a powerful debiasing tool, but everyday advisors
are likely to package advice in ways that make advisees more likely to hear and heed
it. Even in a futuristic world with accurate AI advice, peer advice is a useful resource
for policymakers to tap into, and AI increases the number of options for doing so.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to resurrect an ancient technology for improving the
welfare of others: advice from friends and family. This longstanding and simple idea
now has a burgeoning psychological literature to support it. Advice-giving promises
to be one of the most powerful debiasing strategies ever discovered. Advisors
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routinely offer advice that is unaffected by the fundamental attribution error,
confirmation bias, omission bias, betrayal aversion, loss aversion, probability
neglect, and hyperbolic discounting. That is, people who routinely succumb to biases
when making decisions for themselves think far more clearly when generating
advice for others. Advisors also find more creative solutions and see the forest rather
than the trees. These newly-confirmed benefits suggest that peer advice could be a
powerful resource for improving decision-making. In a world with frayed social
connections and increasingly small friend networks, the benefits of advice are harder
for many people to capture. Accordingly, policymakers should seriously consider
whether and how to promote advice-seeking and advice-giving. They could do so
with softer and harder forms of intervention—everything from merely advising
people to seek advice to mandating that people seek it. The prospect of personalizing
law in general, and personalizing advice in particular through big data and AI, offers
the possibility of tailoring these interventions to account for each individual’s
personality type, decision environment, and the unique resources that their particular
friend network offers. These personalizations mitigate various objections to harder
forms of intervention, and make softer ones more effective. Until this level of
personalization is possible, and even after it is, policymakers can do a great deal of
good by simply promoting everyday advice from friends and family. Sometimes, the
old ways are the best ways, or at the very least, the old ways continue to offer unique
opportunities that should be embraced rather than squandered.

